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ABSTRACT—After decades of debate, the lines of distinction between
textualism and purposivism have been carefully drawn with respect to the
judicial task of statutory interpretation. Far less attention has been devoted
to the question of how executive branch officials approach statutory
interpretation. While scholars have contrasted agencies’ interpretive
practices from those of courts, they have not yet developed a theory of
agency statutory interpretation.
This Article develops a purposivist theory of agency statutory
interpretation on the ground that regulatory statutes oblige agencies to
implement the statutes they administer in that manner. Regulatory statutes
not only grant powers but also impose a duty on agencies to carry out those
powers in accordance with the principles or purposes the statutes establish.
To comply with that duty, agencies must develop a conception of the
purposes that the statute requires them to pursue and select a course of
action that best carries forward those purposes within the means permitted
by the statute; in short, agencies must take a purposivist approach.
Moreover, this Article argues that agencies’ institutional capacities—a
familiar constellation of expertise, indirect political accountability, and
ability to vet proposals before adopting them—make them ideally suited to
carry out the task of purposive interpretation.
Understanding agency interpretation as purposive by statutory design
has significant implications for long-standing debates. First, it suggests that
the focus of judicial review should be on the agency’s specification of the
statute’s purposes and chosen means to implement those purposes,
questions that are not squarely addressed by the Chevron doctrine. Second,
by providing an account of the character of the agency’s statutory duties,
this analysis helps to distinguish appropriate from inappropriate political
and presidential influences on the agency. Finally, investigating the debate
between purposivism and textualism beyond the courts exposes a renewed
promise—and project—for purposivism.
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INTRODUCTION
From the beginning of the Republic,1 with increasing energy in the last
eighty years,2 Congress has been enacting statutes that vest administrative
officials with the power to make laws governing many aspects of our
national life. To act under such grants of statutory authority, administrative
officials must interpret them. Courts review only a small percentage of
administrative decisions, so administrative agencies are often not only the

1 See JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE
HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2012) (excavating the wide range of
administrative practice in the country’s first century); JOHN PRESTON COMER, LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS
OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES 21–112 (1927) (providing a compilation of
administrative delegations prior to 1927).
2 See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, Madison’s Nightmare, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 335, 338–39 (1990)
(noting that following the New Deal, Congress continued to create programs that delegated broad
implementing authority to agencies); Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal,
101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 424 & n.9 (1987) (noting the rapid rise of delegation to administrative agencies
following the New Deal).
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first, but also the final interpreters. As the scope of administrative agency
responsibilities has grown to match those of the modern state, agency
interpreters have become “the primary official interpreters of federal
statutes.”3
Perhaps reflecting a nostalgic view that law exists only in the hands of
courts,4 the theory and practice of agency statutory interpretation has
received much less attention than judicial statutory interpretation—so much
so that even the phrase “judicial statutory interpretation” has an awkward,
redundant ring, while “agency statutory interpretation” invites an
explanatory aside.5 The lively debates between textualists and purposivists
in statutory interpretation have largely passed over the question of how
agencies interpret statutes. We lack an account of what it means for an
agency to be a faithful agent of Congress, a foundational question for
theories of judicial statutory interpretation.6
The slender but careful scholarly literature on agency statutory
interpretation has made incremental contributions to understanding
agencies’ interpretive practices. It has revealed interpretive norms that
3 Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the Paradox of Deference: A Preliminary Inquiry into
Agency Statutory Interpretation, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 501, 502–03 (2005) [hereinafter Mashaw, Norms].
For an early expression of the same, see Marshall E. Dimock, The Role of Discretion in Modern
Administration, in THE FRONTIERS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 45, 56 (John M. Gaus, Leonard D.
White & Marshall E. Dimock eds., 1936), explaining “[t]he initial responsibility for enforcing the law
falls to administrative officials; it is only when extraordinary circumstances require it that the
enforcement agencies of the judicial department are brought into operation. There is no intrinsic
difference between law which the administrator carries out and the law which the judge enforces; the
principal difference is that the judge usually has the last word in case of a conflict of interpretation.” For
more recent expressions, see, for example, Robert A. Katzmann, Madison Lecture, Statutes, 87 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 637, 656 & n.111 (2012), in which Judge Katzmann documents recent recognition of agencies
as the first and frequently primary interpreters of statutes, and sources discussed in infra Part I.
4 Scholars have been railing against this perception for some time. In 1936, Marshall Dimock
complained, “[j]udges still talk about law as if it were the monopoly of the legal profession. They
assume that all judge-made law consists of rules and principles, whereas administrative discretion is
arbitrary in its very nature.” Dimock, supra note 3, at 52. This theme finds prominent expression in
Edward Rubin’s work. See, e.g., EDWARD L. RUBIN, BEYOND CAMELOT: RETHINKING POLITICS AND
LAW FOR THE MODERN STATE 212 (2005) (providing an account of the conceptual awkwardness of
early judge-centered conceptions of law for the modern state); see also JEREMY WALDRON, THE
DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION 11 (1999) (questioning why common law developed by judges and courts
remains central focus of jurisprudence in the age of legislation); Nestor M. Davidson & Ethan J. Leib,
Regleprudence—At OIRA and Beyond, 103 GEO. L.J. 259 (2015) (calling for development of a
jurisprudence attentive to law beyond the courts, and providing a case study of OIRA’s practice of stare
decisis).
5 See Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
1189, 1190 & n.2 (2006) (noting both the dearth of literature on executive branch statutory
interpretation and the importance of the issue). This Article addresses only federal agencies and follows
the dominant trend of treating them as part of the Executive Branch. See id. at 1191 nn.3–4 (noting that
locating agencies within the Executive Branch is the dominant trend).
6 See Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory
Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 593, 593–95 (1995) (noting that a fundamental project of theories of
statutory interpretation is reconciling the judicial role with fidelity to legislative supremacy).
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apply to agencies but not courts,7 and gestured at ways in which agencies’
institutional competences8 and occasions for interpretation9 distinguish their
approaches from those of courts.10 While this comparative exercise has
usefully isolated some contrasting norms, it has not sought to bundle or
ground the norms of agency interpretive practice. In short, it has not yet
developed a theory of agency statutory interpretation.
This Article develops such a theory based on a simple but ambitious
claim: Congress, in its statutory delegations, directs agencies to adopt a
purposive interpretive method. This argument builds on the idea that
regulatory statutes—that is, statutes that delegate lawmaking power to
administrative agencies—are legally distinctive. Not only do they vest
agencies with authority, but they also impose obligations to exercise that
authority in accordance with purposes or principles that Congress has
established in the statute. Congress sometimes specifies the purposes or
principles to guide the agency in great detail, and at other times sets forth
the principles or purposes the agency must pursue at a high level of
generality. But even when regulatory statutes lack specificity,
constitutional law provides a distinctive backstop: A constitutionally valid
delegation of lawmaking power to an administrative agency must include
an “intelligible principle”11 to guide the agency’s action. While the
Supreme Court has been extremely permissive as to what counts as an
intelligible principle, the doctrine still requires that there is some principle,

7 See Mashaw, Norms, supra note 3, at 522 tbl.1; Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge Is Not the
Primary Official with Responsibility to Read: Agency Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative
History, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 321, 347 (1990) [hereinafter Strauss, Agency Interpretation]; KENT
GREENAWALT, STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW INTERPRETATION 141–74 (2013).
8 ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL
INTERPRETATION 213–14, 226 (2006) (suggesting that agencies’ superior expertise may justify widerranging interpretive methods than apply for courts); Michael Herz, Purposivism and Institutional
Competence in Statutory Interpretation, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 89, 94–106 (arguing that agencies’
institutional competences justify a purposive approach to statutory interpretation); see also
GREENAWALT, supra note 7, at 146–53 (examining implications of agency and court institutional
differences for their interpretive approaches); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Expanding Chevron’s Domain:
A Comparative Institutional Analysis of the Relative Competence of Courts and Agencies to Interpret
Statutes, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 411, 420–27 [hereinafter Eskridge, Expanding Chevron’s Domain]
(arguing that agencies comparative expertise and accountability better suit them to interpret statutes
broadly in accordance with their purposes, taking into account political preferences).
9 Mashaw, Norms, supra note 3, at 525; Kevin M. Stack, Agency Statutory Interpretation and
Policymaking Form, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 225, 226 [hereinafter Stack, Agency Policymaking Form].
10 And the literature has questioned the extent to which an authentic and independent agency
practice is possible given the structures of agency representation in the Supreme Court. See Margaret H.
Lemos, The Solicitor General as Mediator Between Court and Agency, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 185,
187.
11 J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928); accord Whitman v. Am.
Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (invoking the “intelligible principle” standard in reviewing
congressional delegations of lawmaking power).
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however general, to which the agency must conform. That gives regulatory
statutes a constitutional distinctiveness. For the agency, complying with the
obligation to conform its conduct to the purposes and principles that
Congress has established in the regulatory statutes the agency
administers—whether those purposes are articulated with great specificity
or at a high level of generality—requires the agency to adopt a purposive
framework of interpretation. By a purposive framework for interpretation, I
mean a framework in which the interpreter has a duty to (1) develop an
understanding of the purposes or principles of the statute, (2) evaluate
alternatives for action in relation to those purposes or principles, (3) act in
ways, other things equal, that best furthers those purposes or principles, and
(4) adopt only interpretations permitted by the statute’s text.12
Beyond arguing that regulatory statutes require agencies to adopt a
purposive approach, this Article also contends that administrative agencies,
perhaps uniquely among government institutions, have the institutional
capacities to implement this interpretive framework. Where, as is often the
case, statutory purposes are established at a high level of generality, an
agency’s greater political responsiveness, expertise, and ability to vet
proposals, make the agency better equipped to implement purposivism than
generalist courts. All told, my claim here is that purposivism is not only
required by regulatory statutes, but also preferable to textualism for
agencies on institutional and functional grounds.
This suggestion that Congress specifies the basic framework for
agency statutory interpretation—that agencies are purposive by statutory
design—stands in sharp contrast to most theory building for federal judicial
statutory interpretation. Notwithstanding the provocative prospect that
Congress may enact rules or methods of statutory interpretation for courts,13
and the recently highlighted practices of some states doing just that,14
Congress has remained decidedly inactive in explicitly legislating norms of
statutory interpretation for courts. As a result, it is generally viewed as
impractical for theories of statutory interpretation for federal courts to be

Students of statutory interpretation will notice that this framework tracks the basic “technique”
of statutory interpretation set forth by Henry Hart and Albert Sacks in their materials, HENRY M. HART,
JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION
OF LAW 1378 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
13 Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2085,
2086 (2002).
14 Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological
Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1771–1811 (2010) [hereinafter
Gluck, Laboratories].
12
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grounded on legislative directions.15 Scholars have looked instead to
ground interpretive methods in the Constitution,16 consequentialist
considerations alone,17 positive understandings of the legislature,18 or the
character of law itself.19 Part of the burden of this Article, then, is to show
that regulatory statutes carry distinctive interpretive directions for agencies.
While the thrust of the argument is normative—it seeks to show both that
regulatory statutes require agencies to engage in purposive interpretation
and that agencies have relatively strong capacities to do so—at various
points it also highlights how this approach is reflected in current agency
(best) practices.
This purposivist understanding of agencies has powerful implications
for two of the most important issues in administrative law: the structure of
judicial review of agency action and the President’s authority over agency
interpretation. As to judicial review, our “appellate model” of judicial
review revolves around determining the level of deference to accord
different types of determinations made by an agency, thus making
distinctions among issues of fact, law, and policy judgment.20 The Chevron
15 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L.
REV. 885, 890 n.13 (2003) (“Although the possibility [that doctrines of statutory interpretation might be
legislated] is both important and interesting, past history shows that it is most unlikely that Congress
will enact rules of interpretation that will generally resolve the disputed issues of interpretive choice.
For good reason, the literature on statutory interpretation, both past and present, focuses on the question
of what interpretive rules judges should use absent legislative intervention; that is our focus here as
well.”); Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549,
570 (1985) (“Congress seldom provides explicit guidance, even in legislative history, on how it wishes
courts to interpret statutory language.”).
16 Either as a necessary ground for methodological commitments, see Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism,
Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation of Statutes, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 827, 838–39 (1991), or
as defining appropriate judicial methods. Compare John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the
Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 56–70 (2001) (arguing “judicial Power” in Article III of the
Constitution bars “equitable” interpretation of statutes), with William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words:
Early Understandings of the “Judicial Power” in Statutory Interpretation, 1776–1806, 101 COLUM. L.
REV. 990 (2001) (defending equitable interpretation of statutes by courts on faithful agency and
historical grounds).
17 See VERMEULE, supra note 8, at 5 (arguing that interpretive approaches should be determined by
those that produce the best consequences).
18 Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An
Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 STAN. L. REV.
725, 749, 775–96 (2014); Jerry L. Mashaw, The Economics of Politics and the Understanding of Public
Law, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 123, 152 (1989); Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory
Interpretation: Legislative History by the Rules, 122 YALE L.J. 70, 74–75 (2012).
19 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 313–54 (1986) (justifying an interpretive approach
to statutes based on a conception of law as integrity); HART & SACKS, supra note 12, at 148 (justifying
a purposive approach to statutory interpretation on grounds that law itself is a purposive activity);
SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 382 (2011) (defending a purposivist approach to interpretation based on a
conception of law as a type of social plan).
20 Thomas W. Merrill, Article III, Agency Adjudication, and the Origins of the Appellate Review
Model of Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 939, 975 (2011).
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inquiry (which now includes whether Chevron deference or Skidmore21
review applies)22 governs questions of statutory interpretation, while
arbitrary and capricious review (and substantial evidence) purports to
govern issues of fact and policy judgment.23 This structure has a host of
problems; perhaps most fundamentally, it remains detached from an
understanding of the obligations Congress imposes on agencies. The
purposive understanding of the agency addresses that detachment. Based
on the premise that agencies have a statutory obligation to interpret their
statutes in a purposive manner, it makes sense that the primary task of a
reviewing court should be to ask whether they have done so validly.
Accordingly, the purposive account suggests that the basic question of
judicial review should be whether the agency’s action furthers the statute’s
purposes within allowable means. Because this theory grounds the
agency’s interpretive stance in the agency’s statutory obligations, not
prudential or consequentialist concerns, it requires courts to approach
review of agency statutory interpretation from the perspective evaluating
the agency’s compliance with its own interpretive duties. Based on the
statutory grounding for purposivism, even textualist courts should review
agency action to assess whether the agency complied with its purposive
obligations. At a doctrinal level, this approach could be thought of as
treating determination of the statute’s purposes and issues of means-ends
rationality, which are currently part of arbitrary and capricious review,24 as
the gateway and framing question of judicial review, displacing Chevron
from its current position as the ordering principle of judicial review of
agency action.
The purposive understanding also clarifies the difficult problem of
determining the type of presidential preferences that play a legitimate role
in agency deliberations. Agencies live in a political environment in which
the President, other executive branch officials, and members of Congress
continually direct, encourage, cajole, and threaten administrators to take (or
to not take) particular actions. One of the most difficult problems facing the
21

Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Under United States v. Mead Corp.,
533 U.S. 218, 234–35 (2001), if Chevron deference is not warranted, the agency’s interpretation will be
reviewed under Skidmore.
23 See Merrill, supra note 20, at 941–42. “Arbitrary and capricious review” is a standard of review
specified by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012) (requiring a
reviewing court to hold unlawful agency action that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law”).
24 As explained below, under well-established doctrine, arbitrary and capricious review requires the
agency to demonstrate a rational connection between the choices made and the statutes’ aims. See infra
Part II.D (discussing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983)).
22
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agency in the first instance, and eventually reviewing courts, is
distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate political influences. But to make
that distinction requires an understanding of the obligations regulatory
statutes impose on the agency. If a garden-variety statutory delegation were
simply understood as creating a zone of discretion for the agency, then
political influence would be an acceptable basis for agency action.
Alternatively, if a statute precisely specified the factors the agency must
consider, and in what measure, political preference alone would not count
as an acceptable basis for agency action. The purposive account offers an
explanation of the character of the agency’s obligations: the agency has
obligations to pursue the statute’s ends. As a result, the purposive account
explains why political influences must, in order to serve as a basis for
agency action, be framed in terms of the statute’s aims and purposes.
Interestingly, by clarifying that the agency’s purposive obligation is
grounded in statutory obligation, not merely prudential or policy concerns,
this Article also exposes the limits on the President’s power to direct
agencies to adopt an alternative interpretive approach.
Finally, this Article exposes an important foothold in the ongoing
rethinking of purposivism. Critics have challenged purposivism, and Henry
Hart and Albert Sacks’s classic account of it in The Legal Process,25 on the
ground that it adopts an unrealistic and naïve view of the legislature.26 This
theory of agency purposivism sidesteps those critiques. It does not require
taking a position on the nature of law, or even on whether all statutes have
purposes or whether courts should be in the business of deciding the level
of generality of those purposes. Rather, this approach is more particularlist;
it suggests that the purposive orientation of agency statutory interpretation
follows the distinctive character of regulatory statutes and the agency’s
institutional capacities, and is not grounded in more general claims about
the inherent features of statutes as a whole. This opens up the prospect that
purposivism might have its strongest application to agencies’ interpretation
of statutes they administer. This attention to the foundation of purposivism
in positive law extends recent work recognizing the “new,” “structured,” or
“textually constrained” positivist purposivism in judicial practice,27 which
25

See HART & SACKS, supra note 12.
Informed by public choice theory, critics also argue legislation is a product of compromise and
so frequently lacks purposes, and that the legislative text alone provides the best guidance on the
compromise the legislature reached. See John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists and Purposivists?,
106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 99–101 (2006) [hereinafter Manning, What Divides]; see also infra Part III.B.
27 John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113 passim (articulating new
purposivism reflected in Supreme Court statutory interpretation) [hereinafter Manning, New
Purposivism]; see also Gluck, Laboratories, supra note 14, at 1842–46 (giving account of “modified
textualism” or “structured purposivism” in state statutory interpretation); Kevin M. Stack, Interpreting
26
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relies more heavily on statutory text as a basis for understanding purpose
and views purposivist interpretations as constrained by statutory text.
This Article is organized as follows. Part I situates agency statutory
interpretation in the context of interpretive tasks in the administrative state,
summarizes what we do and do not know about it, and suggests why we
should look to Congress as a source of interpretive direction. Part II turns
to regulatory statutes and argues that they impose duties on agencies to
interpret them in a purposivist manner. It isolates the formal or positive
features of statutes that impose purposive obligations on agencies. Part III
argues that agencies have the institutional competence to engage in
purposive interpretation. It also responds to general critiques of
purposivism mounted by textualists and argues that they do not have the
same force with regard to agency statutory interpretation. Part IV discusses
the implications of a purposive understanding for judicial review,
presidential influence on agencies, and the future of purposivism.
Before turning to these arguments, it is important to highlight that talk
of “agency” statutory interpretation involves a generalization. Agencies and
the statutes they administer differ in many ways. 28 Just as clearly, agencies’
occasions for interpretation—whether in a rulemaking, adjudication,
permitting, or otherwise—and the officers within the agency doing the
interpreting also have implications for the menu of their interpretive
options.29 Given the diversity of agencies and their occasions for
interpretation, talk of “agency” or “executive branch” statutory
interpretation may involve even greater generalization than consideration
of “judicial” statutory interpretation.30 But if there is a useful contrast
between agency and judicial statutory interpretation, it is worth isolating
Regulations, 111 MICH. L. REV. 355, 362 (2012) [hereinafter Stack, Interpreting Regulations]
(defending positively grounded purposivism as the method for interpreting regulations).
28 For a concise overview of the variety of agency forms, see DAVID E. LEWIS & JENNIFER L.
SELIN, ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., SOURCEBOOK OF UNITED STATES EXECUTIVE AGENCIES
(2012).
29 See Stack, Agency Policymaking Form, supra note 9, at 226 (arguing that agency statutory
interpretation is in part a function of the form through which it acts).
30 See Caleb Nelson, Statutory Interpretation and Decision Theory, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 329, 360
(2007) (reviewing VERMEULE, supra note 8 and arguing that while it is possible to consider in general
terms the capacities of the federal judiciary, agencies are more heterogeneous, and that a thoroughgoing
institutional analysis would require moving beyond such general referents). Some scholars have
investigated how a court’s position within the federal judiciary matters to statutory interpretation. See
Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 317, 318
(2005) (arguing that a super strong stare decisis canon should not apply in courts of appeals); AaronAndrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchy and Heterogeneity: How to Read a Statute in a Lower Court, 97 CORNELL
L. REV. 433, 472–79 (2012) (arguing that lower courts should heed more closely the text and largely
avoid legislative history). The different modes of appointment may also have interpretive implications.
See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl & Ethan J. Leib, Elected Judges and Statutory Interpretation, 79 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1215, 1237–54 (2012).

880

STACK (DO NOT DELETE)

109:871 (2015)

10/2/2015 1:21 PM

Purposivism in the Executive Branch

those broader gauge differences and their grounds, even if the theory will
be later subject to specification for different types of agencies or occasions
for interpretation.
I.

AGENCY STATUTORY INTERPRETATION IN CONTEXT

To understand the need for a theory of agency statutory interpretation,
it is first useful to situate agency statutory interpretation within the
landscape of interpretive tasks in the administrative state. This background
helps to illustrate the importance of agency statutory interpretation. It also
provides a context for examining existing treatments of agency statutory
interpretation in which scholars have usefully isolated differences between
courts and agencies, but not yet developed a principled theory of agency
statutory interpretation.
A. Interpretation in the Administrative State
Over the last thirty years, a sophisticated understanding of judicial
statutory interpretation has emerged.31 The debate over how courts do and
should interpret statutes has narrowed to two primary interpretive
approaches: textualism and purposivism.32 These approaches represent
different theories of interpretation in the sense that they offer different
accounts of the goals of interpretation,33 the sources of interpretation,34 and
the relationship among those sources. Textualists take understanding the
meaning of enacted text as the sole object of interpretation.35 In contrast,

31 One strain of this literature provides a positive account of how judges use various tools of
statutory interpretation, such as canons and legislative history, and the extent to which those sources
constrain them to reach outcomes that would not be predicted by their political background. See, e.g.,
FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 160–77 (2009)
(testing plain meaning and legislative history and finding legislative history more constraining); James
J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning,
58 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2005) (providing an account of use and relatively thin constraint imposed by
substantive and linguistic canons); James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Liberal Justices’ Reliance on
Legislative History: Principle, Strategy, and the Scalia Effect, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 117
(2008) (offering an empirical study of the constraining effects and strategic uses of legislative history in
employment decisions); James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The Warp and Woof of Statutory
Interpretation: Comparing Supreme Court Approaches in Tax Law and Workplace Law, 58 DUKE L.J.
1231 (2009) (showing distinctive use and role of legislative history in these areas).
32 See Manning, What Divides, supra note 26, at 78 (engaging the distinction); Jonathan T. Molot,
The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2006) (framing the statutory
interpretation debate as between textualist and purposivists); see also Gluck, Laboratories, supra note
14, at 1761–62 (noting the same).
33 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 219 (2d ed.
2006).
34 Id.; see also Caleb Nelson, What is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 357–58 (2005) (invoking
this distinction in comparison between textualism and its alternatives).
35 Manning, What Divides, supra note 26, at 73–75; see infra Part III.B.
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purposivists treat the text as the best evidence of statutory purposes and a
source of constraint, but understand interpretation as a process of
implementing statutory purposes, not merely adhering to statutory text.36
At the same time that the lines of distinction between textualism and
purposivism have been refined, there has been a robust debate over how
courts should review an agency’s interpretation of a statute that grants the
agency lawmaking power. Chevron provides a common shorthand for this
issue, in reference to the Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.37 Chevron famously requires a
reviewing court to accept an agency’s construction of a statute the agency
administers so long as it is permissible under the statute and reasonable,38
as opposed to imposing the court’s own construction on the statute as it
would do for statutes not administered by the agency. 39 But to judge the
permissibility of an agency’s interpretation under Chevron requires an
approach to statutory interpretation.40 The methodology of judicial statutory
interpretation has thus become a critical question for administrative law—
and how a court is to judge the permissibility of the agency’s interpretation
under Chevron has become a critical flashpoint for debates over statutory
interpretation.41
For all the prominence and color of these debates, they overlook much
of the interpretive activity in the federal administrative state. This neglect
can be classified along two primary dimensions. First, as to the sources of
law, the traditional focus on judicial statutory interpretation overlooks
36

See Manning, What Divides, supra note 26, at 73–75; see also sources cited infra Part III.B.
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
38 See id. at 843–44. This speaks to a fundamental premise of Chevron: that statutes fall into two
basic types: those administered by agencies and those administered by courts. See id. at 843 (“The
power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created . . . program necessarily
requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by
Congress.”) (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974)); id. at 844 (“We have long recognized
that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive department’s construction of a statutory
scheme it is entrusted to administer . . . .”). The reviewing court’s duty of deference under Chevron
applies only to those statutes the agency administers. See id. at 844.
39 Id. at 843 (admonishing that when the statutory delegation is ambiguous, the reviewing court
“does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an
administrative interpretation” (footnote omitted)).
40 The Chevron decision itself took the view that the reviewing court should assess the
permissibility of an agency’s interpretation by “employing traditional tools of statutory construction.”
Id. at 843 n.9.
41 For lively, and now canonical, exemplars, compare Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys.
for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 697–98 (1995) (Stevens, J.) (consulting both text and purpose in review
of agency’s decision), with id. at 717 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that legislative text clearly
prohibits the agency’s interpretation); compare also MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S.
218, 227–28 (1994) (Scalia, J.) (reversing agency interpretation based on textualist sources), with id. at
242 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court should uphold agency interpretation in view of
statutory scheme and purposes).
37
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notice-and-comment regulations, which are widely viewed as creating more
legal obligations than federal statutes.42 Recent scholarship has begun to
address the interpretive issues posed by regulations.43 Second, as to the
identity of the interpreter, scholars have long recognized that administrative
agencies make many more statutory interpretations than federal courts, and
that agencies’ decisions are frequently not reviewed by courts, and thus are
often final. But how do agencies interpret the statutes they administer? In
other words, how do agencies reach the very interpretations that courts
review, whether under the Chevron standard or otherwise?
Scholars addressing agency statutory interpretation have proceeded by
isolating contrasts between agency and judicial practices. In this
literature—which we might chart as beginning with Peter Strauss’s
insightful 1990 article44—the primary approach has been to identify a
difference in the institutional role or capacity between agencies and courts,
and then to trace the implications for interpretive method. Because courts
and agencies are such different institutions, the work has been plentiful. To
start, agencies are political institutions by design in ways that courts are
not.45 As a result, it is widely accepted that executive branch officials’ and
Congress’s preferences have a legitimate role in agency statutory
interpretation.46 Likewise, as members of the Executive Branch, agencies
42 See CORNELIUS M. KERWIN & SCOTT R. FURLONG, RULEMAKING: HOW GOVERNMENT
AGENCIES WRITE LAW AND MAKE POLICY 13–21 (4th ed. 2011) (documenting, in terms of the number
of rules and pages of the Federal Register devoted to federal regulations, a level of production of
regulations beginning in the 1970s that far exceeds comparable measures for statutes).
43 See Stack, Interpreting Regulations, supra note 27 (providing an overview of literature and a
defense of purposive methodology of regulatory interpretation); Jennifer Nou, Regulatory Textualism,
64 Duke L.J. (forthcoming 2015) (providing an overview of literature and defending a textualist
methodology of regulatory interpretation).
44 See Strauss, Agency Interpretation, supra note 7.
45 See id. at 329; Matthew C. Stephenson, Statutory Interpretation by Agencies, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 285, 294–300 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph
O’Connell eds., 2010) (providing a concise summary of the extent and character of congressional and
presidential political influence on agencies).
46 GREENAWALT, supra note 7, at 143 (noting that agencies have more direct responsibilities to the
President and Congress than courts have); ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES 26 (2014)
(“Agency responsiveness to congressional signals [in addition to] statutory text makes sense from a
policy and good-governance perspective of trying to interpret and implement the law consistent with
legislative meaning. It also makes sense from the perspective of practical politics.”); Frank H.
Easterbrook, Judicial Discretion in Statutory Interpretation, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 3 (2004) (“Everything
an agency is likely to rely on—political pressure, the President’s view of happy outcomes . . . legislative
history (including letters or tongue-lashings from members of the Congress, as well as the committee
reports), and other tools of policy wonks—is off limits to textualist judges.”); Mashaw, Norms, supra
note 3, at 506 (“[W]e should expect agencies to interpret statutes in the context of presidential
direction.”); Strauss, Agency Interpretation, supra note 7, at 329 (observing that agencies are
“concededly political”). We know that political experience influences selection and decisions of federal
judges, too; scholars have just begun the project of incorporating that understanding into approaches to
judicial statutory interpretation. See James J. Brudney, Recalibrating Federal Judicial Independence,
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are expected to be effective in adopting good policy, and to be called to
account when they are not; as Judge Frank Easterbrook writes, “‘good’
outcomes are exactly what an agency sets out to achieve when exercising
discretion.”47
Moreover, agencies’ multilevel and ongoing relationship with
Congress48 has been understood as transforming the role of legislative
history for the agency.49 Whereas courts confront particular regulatory
statutes at most episodically, and thus come to any given regulatory statute
“cold,” agencies “essentially live the process of statutory interpretation.”50
Agencies participate extensively in the legislative drafting process.51 That
can give the agency firsthand knowledge of the critical debates and the
character of their resolution, knowledge a court could never have
firsthand52 and that would be extremely costly to acquire secondhand,
making agencies more reliable readers of legislative history. For these and
other reasons, many scholars have taken the view that different interpretive
methodologies apply to agency and judicial statutory interpretation.53

64 OHIO ST. L.J. 149, 161–66 (2003) (documenting influence of political background on judicial
decisions and suggesting how those influences may call for greater candor and self-conscious judicial
attitudes).
47 Easterbrook, supra note 46, at 3.
48 See KATZMANN, supra note 46, at 24–27 (describing the ways in which Congress expects
agencies will follow its directives outside of those in statutory text, including the special importance of
congressional committee communications in implementing their statutory powers); Stephenson, supra
note 45, at 294–97 (providing a compact account of congressional vehicles for ex post influence over
agency statutory interpretation).
49 See KATZMANN, supra note 46, at 26–27 (noting congressional oversight heightens the
importance of committee reports to agencies interpreting statutes); Katzmann, supra note 3, at 646
(justifying use of legislative history, in part, on grounds of congressional practice); Strauss, Agency
Interpretation, supra note 7, at 347–49 (explaining how the relationship between agency and
congressional overseers transforms the place of legislative history in agency practice); see also
Bressman & Gluck, supra note 18, at 768 (documenting that congressional staffers anticipate agencies
evaluating legislative history); Christopher J. Walker, Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, 67 STAN.
L. REV. 999, 1038 (2015) (reporting that 76% of rule drafters surveyed viewed legislative history as a
useful tool for interpreting statutes).
50 Strauss, Agency Interpretation, supra note 7, at 329, 346. Interestingly, Nicholas Parrillo’s recent
work suggests that federal agencies’ and federal litigators’ unique capacities to marshal legislative
history in arguments to the Supreme Court may have contributed to the Supreme Court’s increased
reliance on legislative history in upholding agency power. See Nicholas R. Parrillo, Leviathan and
Interpretive Revolution: The Administrative State, the Judiciary, and the Rise of Legislative History,
1890–1950, 123 YALE L.J. 266, 342–51, 374 (2013).
51 Bressman & Gluck, supra note 18, at 738 fig.2; Walker, supra note 49, at 1037 (reporting that
78% of rule drafters surveyed indicated that their agencies always or often participate in technical
statutory drafting, and 59% said that their agencies always or often participate in policy or substantive
drafting).
52 Strauss, Agency Interpretation, supra note 7, at 347.
53 See, e.g., GREENAWALT, supra note 7, at 146–58 (explicating how role and function make
agencies’ interpretive mission different from that of courts); VERMEULE, supra note 8, at 213 (arguing
that agencies can apply a “richer interpretive palette” than courts); Easterbrook, supra note 46, at 3

884

STACK (DO NOT DELETE)

109:871 (2015)

10/2/2015 1:21 PM

Purposivism in the Executive Branch

These contrasting norms of interpretation are nicely brought together
by Jerry Mashaw in a preliminary summary of the interpretive canons that
apply exclusively or with greater force to agency interpretation,54 and those
that apply exclusively or with greater force to courts.55 Mashaw makes
clear that this set of contrasts does not amount to a defense of “any
particular methodology of statutory interpretation for administrators.”56
This qualification makes sense. Identifying contrasting canons or norms,
while providing a starting point for further analysis, does not itself offer a
theory of agency statutory interpretation because this identification does
not provide an account of how these (or other) canons fit together, nor of
their relative priority, the aims of agency interpretation, its permissible
sources, or its ultimate grounds. With these observed contrasts in place, it is
now time to develop a theory of agency statutory interpretation.
B. Grounds for an Interpretive Approach
The first question is what might ground an interpretive theory for
agencies. Consider three possibilities: the Constitution, statutes, or
institutional and consequentialist considerations. Adrian Vermeule is one of
the few scholars to have staked out a position on these issues. He argues
that interpretive choice for agencies, as for courts, should be made based on
institutional and consequentialist grounds. Regarding statutory
interpretation by courts, Vermeule argues that “[b]ecause the Constitution
does not speak to interpretive method, the decisive considerations are

(arguing that Article II officers’ greater political accountability entitles them to more interpretive
discretion than life-tenured Article III judges); Mashaw, Norms, supra note 3, at 522–23 (providing a
preliminary account of different norms of interpretation); Strauss, Agency Interpretation, supra note 7,
at 328–31 (describing how the institutional position of agencies distinguishes their interpretive
obligations, especially vis-à-vis legislative history, from those of judges). Not all scholars agree that
agency and judicial interpretation diverge. Professor Richard Pierce, for instance, has argued that
agency statutory interpretation should not differ from judicial statutory interpretation because both are
essentially about discerning the meaning of statutory provisions. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., How
Agencies Should Give Meaning to the Statutes They Administer: A Response to Mashaw and Strauss,
59 ADMIN. L. REV. 197, 204–05 (2007). For a discussion of this view, see infra text accompanying
notes 128–35.
54 For canons that apply to agencies, Mashaw includes: “Follow presidential directions unless
clearly outside your authority.”; “Use legislative history as a primary interpretive guide.”; “Interpret to
give energy and breadth to all legislative programs within your jurisdiction.”; “Engage in activist
lawmaking.”; “Pay particular attention to the strategic parameters of interpretive efficiency.”; and
“Interpret to insure hierarchical control over subordinates.” Mashaw, Norms, supra note 3, at 522 tbl.1.
55 For canons that apply to courts, Mashaw includes: “Interpret to avoid raising constitutional
questions.”; “Respect all judicial precedent.”; and “Interpret to lend coherence to the overall legal
order.” Id. Mashaw offers this list as a prompt for debate, and other scholars have bolstered and
whittled away at its contents. See, e.g., Morrison, supra note 5, at 1222–26 (challenging Mashaw’s
suggestion that agency actors should not apply the canon of constitutional avoidance).
56 Mashaw, Norms, supra note 3, at 521.
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institutional.”57 Vermeule reaches the same conclusion for agencies.58
Based on the premise that institutional considerations ground interpretive
choice for both courts and agencies, Vermeule argues that limitations on
judicial competence suggest that courts should adopt formalist methods of
interpretation, whereas agencies’ wider capacities justify granting them “[a]
richer interpretive palette,” including purposive principles.59 In this regard,
Vermeule adopts a similar position to those scholars just discussed who
view agency statutory interpretation as diverging from judicial statutory
interpretation because of the agency’s greater technical competence,
knowledge of the legislative history and legislative preferences, and
political responsiveness.60
Even if one agrees that the Constitution does not provide direction as
to agencies’ interpretive method,61 turning directly to institutional
considerations moves too quickly past statutes as a possible source of
interpretive direction to agencies. To be sure, as noted, agencies have very
different competences and institutional positions than courts. Those
differences may well inform their interpretive approach;62 indeed, I turn to
assess those differences below.63 But we cannot conclude that these
institutional considerations are decisive without first asking whether
congressional statutes directed agencies’ interpretive approach. Congress
has wide constitutional authority to structure the implementation of federal
law under the Necessary and Proper Clause,64 including how administrative
agencies do the jobs Congress assigns them. Given basic premises of
legislative supremacy and how comprehensively regulatory statutes

57

VERMEULE, supra note 8, at 33.
See id. at 213.
59 Id.
60 See id.
61 One possible dissenting voice is Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch:
Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 340–42 (1994) (arguing on the grounds that
would also apply to statutory interpretation that the President has a constitutional duty to adopt a
“restrained” interpretive methodology that privileges text, original meaning, structure, and precedent).
62 See GREENAWALT, supra note 7, at 149–56; VERMEULE, supra note 8, at 208–11; Herz, supra
note 8, at 96–106; Mashaw, Norms, supra note 3, at 505–16; Strauss, Agency Interpretation, supra note
7, at 329–30; see also Eskridge, Expanding Chevron’s Domain, supra note 8, at 421–27 (also arguing
agencies’ institutional competences bear on their interpretive approach).
63 See infra Part III.A–B.
64 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (granting Congress the power “[t]o make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by
this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof”).
This Clause has been interpreted to permit Congress “discretion, with respect to the means by which the
powers it confers are to be carried into execution.” McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,
421 (1819).
58
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structure agencies and agency action, it makes sense to first ask whether
Congress provides interpretive directions to agencies in regulatory statutes.
II. THE AGENCY’S PURPOSIVE DUTY
Scholars have considered how Congress, and more recently, state
legislatures, provide explicitly interpretive directions to courts, ranging
from statutory definitions and codes of interpretation to more full-scale
interpretive frameworks.65 But this literature on legislative direction has not
considered the extent to which congressional statutes provide interpretive
directions to federal agencies.
This Part takes on that question. It argues that regulatory statutes
impose a duty upon agencies to interpret the statutes they administer in a
purposive manner. To some, this claim might appear too broad because it
lumps together all regulatory statutes,66 a vast and diverse set of laws. For
that skeptical audience, the challenge is to show that there is a sufficient
commonality in regulatory statutes to support this general interpretive duty.
To others, the claim might appear to be commonplace in the sense that
many assume agencies act in a purposive manner, seeking to carry out the
ends Congress has set for the agency consistent with the means it has
allowed. For the audience that understands agency interpretation as
purposive, it is still worthwhile to isolate the source of this interpretive
orientation as that explains who can change it and through what means.67
Section A argues that a combination of formal features of regulatory
statutes—namely, vesting of power and imposing a duty to act in
accordance with purpose or intelligible principles—establishes a duty for
agencies to implement their statutes in a purposive manner. Section B
provides a general description of the implications of this duty for the
agency, and Section C suggests how well this duty describes agency
practice by providing examples from agency statutory interpretation.
Section D argues that foundational doctrines of administrative law
reinforce and police this duty. Finally, Section E argues the agency’s duty
to implement also requires the agency to interpret the statutes it administers
in a purposive manner.
65

See Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, supra note 13, at 2139–40; see also Gluck, Laboratories, supra
note 14, at 1794–95; Linda D. Jellum, “Which Is to Be Master,” the Judiciary or the Legislature? When
Statutory Directives Violate Separation of Powers, 56 UCLA L. REV. 837, 882–83 (2009).
66 See Nelson, supra note 30, at 360 (suggesting that agencies’ institutional diversity impedes the
prospect for generalization about agency approaches to statutory interpretation).
67 Cf. Abbe R. Gluck, The Federal Common Law of Statutory Interpretation: Erie for the Age of
Statutes, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 753, 757 (2013) [hereinafter Gluck, Federal Common Law]
(observing that if rules of statutory interpretation for courts have the status of common law then
Congress can legislate over them).
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A. The Elements of Statutory Obligation
Regulatory statutes—the surviving and newly minted delegations of
lawmaking authority to agencies—have a splendid variety.68 They bear the
marks of the political and social circumstances that prompted the creation
of the agency, as well as those that prompted reorganizations, expansions,
and constrictions of the agency’s powers.69 They also reflect legislative
compromises. Amidst that diversity, however, it is possible to identify three
basic and common features: regulatory statutes (1) grant agencies powers,
(2) impose a duty to exercise the powers granted, and (3) provide purposes
or principles the agency must pursue and to which the agency must
conform its actions.
These formal features of regulatory statutes combine to create a core
obligation of administrative agencies: the duty to evaluate alternatives,
justify their choices, and act to further the goals, aims, and principles—the
purposes—their authorizing statutes establish. Though the statutory
expression of these elements varies and frequently overlaps, it is useful to
first consider them in isolation. Because statutes do not often make for
compelling reading, I provide illustrative examples to support these points
in the margin.
1. Vesting of Powers.—The most basic feature of a regulatory statute
is the vesting of lawmaking and other powers in the agency. “[A]n agency
literally has no power to act . . . unless and until Congress confers power
upon it.”70 Regulatory statutes vary widely in the powers they grant
agencies—whether to make rules, adjudicate, sue, license, permit, advise,
investigate, manage resources, purchase, and so on—and even more in the
way in which they structure these powers. Some regulatory statutes make
highly specific authorizations; for instance, an agency’s power over
particular matters may be vested by a provision relating to a specific
program or subagency charged with administering the task.71 Others grant

68 For a narrative compilation of these delegations from the beginning of the Republic through the
1920s, see John Preston Comer’s chapter, “The History of Administrative Legislation” in COMER,
supra note 1, at 50–112. For a description of current delegations, see LEWIS & SELIN, supra note 28.
69 See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY (1990)
(providing a classic account of the creation of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration,
legislative and judicial responses to its actions, and the agency’s resulting regulatory approach).
70 La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986).
71 The Department of the Interior provides an example of this type of statutory scheme. The
Department of the Interior is “charged” with the supervision of an enumerated list of subjects and
subagencies in its authorizing statute, 43 U.S.C. § 1457 (2012), but the authorization to take specific
actions in carrying out its supervision is laid out in each regulated subject’s statute. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C.
§ 669i (2012) (referring to wildlife restoration and providing that “[t]he Secretary of the Interior is
authorized to make rules and regulations for carrying out the provisions of this chapter”); id. § 777i
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general authority to implement the statute by delineating actions the agency
is authorized to take,72 or by vesting in the agency general functions or
jurisdiction over a certain subject area.73
The vesting of lawmaking power typically arises with an authorization
to make rules,74 adjudicate disputes,75 or both.76 Frequently, regulatory
statutes include not only specific grants of authority or jurisdiction over
particular matters, but also a general “carry out” or “as may be necessary”
provision. These provisions employ a variety of formulations.77 Regardless
(referring to fish restoration and management projects and providing that “[t]he Secretary of the Interior
is authorized to make rules and regulations for carrying out the provisions of this chapter”).
72 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 5492(a)(10) (2012) (“The [Consumer Financial Protection] Bureau is
authorized to . . . implement[] the Federal consumer financial laws through rules, orders, guidance,
interpretations, statements of policy, examinations, and enforcement actions . . . .”); see also 6 U.S.C.
§ 112(b)(2) (2012) (“The Secretary [of Homeland Security] . . . shall have the authority to make
contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements, and to enter into agreements with other executive
agencies, as may be necessary and proper to carry out the Secretary’s responsibilities under this
chapter . . . .”); 7 U.S.C. § 2204(b) (2012) (“The Secretary [of Agriculture] is authorized to initiate or
expand research and development efforts related to solution of . . . any other problem that the Secretary
may determine has an effect upon the economic development or the quality of life in rural areas.”);
12 U.S.C. § 248 (2012) (providing an extensive list of functions that the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System “shall be authorized and empowered” to perform); 42 U.S.C. § 5842 (2012)
([T]he Nuclear Regulatory Commission shall . . . have licensing and related regulatory authority . . . as
to the following facilities of the Administration . . . .”).
73 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (2012) (“The following functions are vested in the Director of the
Office of Personnel Management . . . .”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1512 (2012) (“[T]o this end [the
Department of Commerce] shall be vested with jurisdiction and control of the departments, bureaus,
offices, and branches of the public service hereinafter specified, and with such other powers and duties
as may be prescribed by law.”); 29 U.S.C. § 557 (2012) (“The following-named offices, bureaus,
divisions, and branches of the public service, and all that pertains to the same, shall be under the
jurisdiction and supervision of the Department of Labor . . . .”).
74 See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 3474 (2012) (“The Secretary [of Education] is authorized to prescribe such
rules and regulations as the Secretary determines necessary or appropriate to administer and manage the
functions of the Secretary or the Department.”).
75 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(3) (2012) (authorizing the Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission to “carry[] out adjudicatory functions under this chapter”); 30 U.S.C. § 823(d)(2)(B)
(2012) (“[A]fter the issuance of a decision of an administrative law judge, the [Federal Mine Safety and
Health Review] Commission may in its discretion . . . order the case before it for review . . . .”).
76 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 156, 160(b) (2012) (providing that “[t]he [National Labor Relations]
Board shall have authority from time to time to make, amend, and rescind . . . rules and regulations as
may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this subchapter” and that the National Labor Relations
Board “shall have power” to issue and adjudicate complaints of unfair labor practices).
77 Some provide that agencies have the authority “to make rules and regulations for the purpose of
carrying out the provisions of this subchapter.” 15 U.S.C. § 46(g) (2012) (emphasis added). Others
authorize agencies to “administer the provisions of this chapter, and for such purpose the Secretary is
authorized (1) to make such rules and regulations . . . as may be necessary in the administration of this
chapter.” 33 U.S.C. § 939(a) (2012) (emphasis added), or “to make such rules and regulations as may
be necessary or appropriate . . . for the execution of the functions vested in them by this chapter,” 15
U.S.C. § 78w(a)(1) (2012) (emphasis added), or “to make, amend, and rescind . . . such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this subchapter,” 29 U.S.C. § 156
(emphasis added). For other examples of “carry out” and “as may be necessary” provisions, see, for
example, 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(12) (2012), providing that “The [Commodity Trading Futures] Commission is
authorized to promulgate such rules and regulations as it deems necessary to govern the operating

889

STACK (DO NOT DELETE)

11/10/2015 4:40 PM

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

of the specific statutory formulation, the basic point is the same: One of the
most fundamental features of regulatory statutes is that they vest authority
in the agency to take actions that bind with the force of law.
2. Imposing Duties.—Regulatory statutes do not only authorize but
also impose duties on the agency. While most statutes grant agencies
considerable discretion in organizing their actions, there is no doubt
regulatory statutes impose duties on the agency to implement the powers
granted. Many statutes build the expression of this duty into the vesting of
power.78 Others separately set out a general duty of the agency to
implement the statute.79 Still others impose a host of highly specific duties
upon agencies—duties to oversee certain subject areas or programs,80 to
procedures and conduct of the business of the Commission,” 12 U.S.C. § 1819(a) (2012), providing that
“The [Federal Deposit Insurance] Corporation . . . shall have power . . . [t]o prescribe by its Board of
Directors such rules and regulations as it may deem necessary to carry out the provisions of this
chapter . . . .,” 20 U.S.C. § 3474, providing that “The Secretary [of Education] is authorized to prescribe
such rules and regulations as the Secretary determines necessary or appropriate to administer and
manage the functions of the Secretary or the Department,” 31 U.S.C. § 321(b)(1) (2012), providing that
“The Secretary [of the Treasury] may . . . prescribe regulations to carry out the duties and powers of the
Secretary . . . .,” and the Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1953, § 6, 18 Fed. Reg. 2053–54 (Apr. 11, 1953),
reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 150 (2012), stating “The Secretary [of Health, Education, and Welfare]
may from time to time make such provisions as the Secretary deems appropriate authorizing the
performance of any of the functions of the Secretary by any other officer, or by any agency or
employee, of the Department.”).
78 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1811(a) (2012) (“[The] Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation . . . shall
insure . . . the deposits of all banks and savings associations which are entitled to the benefits of
insurance under this chapter, and . . . shall have the powers hereinafter granted.”); 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2)
(2012) (“The [Federal Trade] Commission is hereby empowered and directed to prevent persons,
partnerships, or corporations . . . from using unfair methods of competition in or affecting
commerce . . . .”); 15 U.S.C. § 1512 (“It shall be the province and duty of said Department [of
Commerce] to foster, promote, and develop the foreign and domestic commerce, the mining,
manufacturing, and fishery industries of the United States; and to this end it shall be vested with
jurisdiction and control of the departments, bureaus, offices, and branches of the public service . . . .”).
79 See, e.g., 6 U.S.C. § 111(b)(1) (2012) (establishing the “mission” of the Department of
Homeland Security in a series of eight broad commands, including “prevent terrorist attacks within the
United States”); 7 U.S.C. § 2201 (2012) (“[T]he general design and duties of [the Department of
Agriculture] shall be to acquire and to diffuse among the people of the United States useful information
on subjects connected with agriculture . . . .”); 12 U.S.C. § 5491(a) (2012) (“[T]he ‘Bureau of
Consumer Financial Protection’ . . . shall regulate the offering and provision of consumer financial
products or services under the Federal consumer financial laws.”); 31 U.S.C. § 321(a) (providing nine
general functions, including “carry[ing] out services related to finances” that the Secretary of the
Treasury “shall” perform); 42 U.S.C. § 901(b) (2012) (“It shall be the duty of the [Social Security]
Administration to administer the old-age, survivors, and disability insurance program under subchapter
II of this chapter and the supplemental security income program under subchapter XVI of this
chapter.”); 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2012) (“[T]he ‘Federal Communications Commission’ . . . shall execute
and enforce the provisions of this chapter.”); 49 U.S.C. § 301 (2012) (providing nine broad
“[l]eadership, consultation, and cooperation” duties that the Secretary of Transportation “shall”
complete).
80 See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2204b(a) (2012) (“The Secretary of Agriculture . . . shall assume
responsibility for coordinating, a nationwide rural development program . . . .”); 20 U.S.C.
§ 3423d(b)(3) (2012) (“The Secretary [of Education] shall ensure that limited-English-proficient and
language-minority students are included in ways that are valid, reliable, and fair under all standards and
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promulgate specific rules or take certain actions,81 to investigate or study,82
or to act based on some findings83—in addition to or instead of relying on a
single general expression of duty. The consequence for the agency is the
same: It has a duty to implement the powers granted.
3. Purposes and Principles.—Regulatory statutes have a further and
distinctive feature: they include some standard or principle to guide the
agency’s conduct. These may take the form of a general principle or
standard,84 a set of objectives,85 a statement of overall aims or purposes,86 or

assessment development conducted or funded by the Department.”); 42 U.S.C. § 241(a) (2012) (“The
Secretary [of Health and Human Services] shall conduct . . . the [Public Health] Service . . . .”).
81 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78c-3(d)(1) (2012) (“The [Securities and Exchange] Commission shall
prescribe rules . . . necessary to prevent evasions of the mandatory clearing requirements under this
chapter.”); 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a)(1) (2012) (“The Administrator [of the Environmental Protection
Agency] . . . shall publish proposed regulations prescribing a national primary ambient air quality
standard . . . .”); 46 U.S.C. § 40901(a) (2012) (“The [Federal Maritime] Commission shall issue a
license to a person that the Commission determines to be qualified by experience and character to act as
an ocean transportation intermediary.”).
82 See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(4)(B) (“To the extent the [Commodity Futures Trading] Commission
finds that a particular swap, group, category, type, or class of swaps would otherwise be subject to
mandatory clearing . . . the Commission shall . . . investigate the relevant facts and
circumstances . . . .”); 12 U.S.C. § 252(a)(1) (2012) (“[O]nce every 60 months . . . the Board [of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System] . . . shall conduct a study and submit a report to the Congress
detailing the extent of small business lending by all creditors.”); 42 U.S.C. § 5847(a)(1) (2012) (“The
[Nuclear Regulatory] Commission is authorized and directed to make . . . a national survey, which shall
include consideration of each of the existing or future electric reliability regions, or other appropriate
regional areas, to locate and identify possible nuclear energy center sites.”).
83 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2056a(b)(1) (2012) (“The [Consumer Product Safety] Commission
shall . . . examine and assess the effectiveness of any voluntary consumer product safety standards for
durable infant or toddler products . . . .”); 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2012) (“If upon the preponderance of the
testimony taken the [National Labor Relations] Board shall be of the opinion that any person named in
the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, then the Board shall . . .
issue and cause to be served on such person an order requiring such person to cease and desist from
such unfair labor practice . . . .”).
84 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 4513(a)(1) (2012) (“The principal duties of the Director [of the Federal
Housing Finance Agency] shall be . . . to ensure that . . . each regulated entity operates in a safe and
sound manner . . . the operations and activities of each regulated entity foster liquid, efficient,
competitive, and resilient national housing finance markets . . . [and] the activities of each regulated
entity and the manner in which such regulated entity is operated are consistent with the public interest.”
(emphasis added)); 31 U.S.C. § 321(a) (“The Secretary of the Treasury shall . . . prescribe regulations
that the Secretary considers best calculated to promote the public convenience and security, and to
protect the Government and individuals from fraud and loss . . . .” (emphasis added)); 42 U.S.C.
§ 7409(a)–(b) (“The Administrator [of the Environmental Protection Agency] . . . shall publish
proposed regulations prescribing a national primary ambient air quality standard . . . which . . . allow[]
an adequate margin of safety, [and] are requisite to protect the public health.” (emphasis added)).
85 See, e.g., 6 U.S.C. § 111(b)(1) (2012) (stating that the “primary mission of the Department [of
Homeland Security]” is to accomplish eight objectives, including “prevent terrorist attacks within the
United States”); 12 U.S.C. § 248(a)(2) (2012) (providing that the Federal Reserve Board’s
“responsibility [is] to monitor and control monetary and credit aggregates”).
86 See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2201 (2012) (“There shall be . . . a Department of Agriculture, the general
design and duties of which shall be to acquire and to diffuse among the people of the United States
useful information on subjects connected with agriculture, rural development, aquaculture, and human
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a formal declaration of purpose.87 Many statutes also, or primarily, set out
agency purposes in specific terms connected to each subagency, program,
or function the agency oversees.88 The articulation of an agency’s purposes
is frequently interwoven with the duties imposed on the agency. Some
regulatory statutes explicitly link the agency’s purposes and duties by
directing the agency to act in accordance with a separate statement of the
agency’s overall purpose.89 Other statutes connect the agency’s purposes
and duties by stating them together in a single provision.90 Thus, as one
nutrition, in the most general and comprehensive sense of those terms, and to procure, propagate, and
distribute among the people new and valuable seeds and plants.”); 15 U.S.C. § 1512 (2012) (“It shall be
the province and duty of said Department [of Commerce] to foster, promote, and develop the foreign
and domestic commerce, the mining, manufacturing, and fishery industries of the United States . . . .”);
29 U.S.C. § 551 (2012) (“The purpose of the Department of Labor shall be to foster, promote, and
develop the welfare of the wage earners of the United States, to improve their working conditions, and
to advance their opportunities for profitable employment.”); 49 U.S.C. § 101(b) (2012) (“A Department
of Transportation is necessary in the public interest . . . to . . . ensure the coordinated and effective
administration of the transportation programs of the United States Government” in addition to five other
general aims of the agency.”).
87 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 631(a) (2012) (referring to the Small Business Administration and stating
that “[i]t is the declared policy of the Congress that the Government should aid, counsel, assist, and
protect, insofar as is possible, the interests of small-business concerns”); 15 U.S.C. § 2051 (2012)
(listing the “Congressional findings” related to the area regulated by the Consumer Product Safety
Commission and providing that “[t]he purposes of this chapter are . . . to protect the public against
unreasonable risks of injury associated with consumer products” in addition to three other purposes);
20 U.S.C. § 3402 (2012) (stating that “[t]he Congress declares that the establishment of a Department of
Education is in the public interest” and listing seven “purposes of this chapter”); 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012)
(referring to the National Labor Relations Board and providing that “[i]t is hereby declared to be the
policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of
commerce . . . by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the
exercise by workers of full freedom of association [and] self-organization . . . .”).
88 See, e.g., 41 U.S.C. § 1101(b) (2012) (“The purposes of the Office of Federal Procurement
Policy [within the Office of Management and Budget] are to . . . provide overall direction of
Government-wide procurement policies, regulations, procedures, and forms for executive
agencies . . . .”); 42 U.S.C. § 241(a) (2012) (“The Secretary [of Health and Human Services] shall
conduct in the [Public Health] Service . . . research . . . relating to the causes, diagnosis, treatment,
control, and prevention of physical and mental diseases and impairments of man, including water
purification, sewage treatment, and pollution of lakes and streams.”); id. § 5843(b) (“[T]he Director of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation shall perform such functions as the Commission shall delegate
including . . . monitoring, testing and recommending upgrading of systems designed to prevent
substantial health or safety hazards . . . .”).
89 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051(b), 2053(f)(2) (laying out the “purposes of this chapter” relating to
the Consumer Product Safety Commission and providing that “[i]n carrying out any of his functions . . .
the Chairman shall be governed by general policies of the Commission”); see also 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1811(a), 1830 (2012) (providing that the “Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation . . . shall insure . . .
the deposits of all banks and savings associations which are entitled to the benefits of insurance under
this chapter” and that “[i]t is the purpose of this chapter to provide all banks and savings associations
with the same opportunity to obtain and enjoy the benefits of this chapter”); 20 U.S.C. §§ 3402, 3411
(providing a congressional statement of purpose and stating that “[t]he Department [of Education] shall
be administered, in accordance with the provisions of this chapter”).
90 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1512 (providing that the “province and duty” of the Department of
Commerce is “to foster, promote, and develop” certain subject areas); see also 7 U.S.C. § 2201
(describing the Department of Agriculture’s “general design and duties”); 15 U.S.C. § 631a (2012)
(providing congressional declarations of purpose and stating that agencies of the federal government
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might expect given the diversity of statutory delegations, some rely
primarily on broad statements of principle or purpose, and others, in
addition, have sets of principles or purposes formulated much more
specifically as to particular functions, subunits, or tasks.
Providing a set of purposes or principles to guide the agency’s
conduct—even if they are articulated at a very high level of generality—is
not merely a practical reality. It is also required by constitutional law: The
nondelegation doctrine requires that delegations of legislative authority
include an intelligible principle to guide the agency’s action.91 The
Supreme Court has been notoriously (or judiciously) permissive regarding
the level of specificity required in an intelligible principle.92 Under current
doctrine, these principles may be stated vaguely and generally—for
instance, setting air standards that “allow[] an adequate margin of safety,
[and] are requisite to protect the public health,”93 or regulating radio
broadcasting “as public convenience, interest, or necessity requires.”94 Even
if cast at a high level of generality, the nondelegation doctrine requires that
the delegation of lawmaking power include a principle to guide the
agency’s action.95
The nondelegation doctrine thus makes regulatory statutes
constitutionally distinctive. While there are some specific doctrines require
statutory clarity—for instance, the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires
that criminal offenses be defined with sufficient clarity to guide the conduct
of ordinary people96—there is no general constitutional requirement that

including the Small Business Administration “shall use all reasonable means” to carry them out);
47 U.S.C. § 151 (2012) (describing the “purposes” for which the Federal Communications Commission
is created and providing that the Commission “shall execute and enforce the provisions of this
chapter”).
91 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (quoting J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co.
v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)).
92 The Supreme Court has not declared a statute in express violation of the nondelgation doctrine
since 1935. See Margaret H. Lemos, The Other Delegate: Judicially Administered Statutes and the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 405, 418 (2008) [hereinafter Lemos, The Other Delegate];
Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 315 (2000).
93 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2012); see also Whitman, 531 U.S. at 474–76 (upholding this delegation
to the EPA).
94 47 U.S.C. § 303 (2012); see also NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 217–18 (1943) (upholding
this delegation to the FCC).
95 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (“So long as Congress ‘shall lay down
by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [exercise the
delegated authority] is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of
legislative power.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Hampton, 276 U.S. at 409)).
96 See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) (requiring that penal statutes be drafted “with
sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner
that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement”).
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nonregulatory statutes include a principle or purpose.97 As a result,
regulatory statutes are constitutionally distinctive: to be valid, these types
of statutes must include an intelligible principle to which the agency must
conform.
It is worth pausing at this point to address two objections that may be
raised by this discussion of the nondelegation doctrine. First, given how
permissive the Supreme Court has been with regard to what counts as an
intelligible principle, there is a question about what the requirement of an
intelligible principle can do. As argued above, the doctrine marks a formal
distinction between regulatory and nonregulatory statutes: regulatory
statutes must include intelligible principles whereas nonregulatory statutes
need not. In that formal sense, the doctrine makes regulatory statutes
constitutionally distinctive. The question at this point is not how much
guidance these principles provide the agency, but rather whether the agency
has some obligation to evaluate its conduct regarding some principle or
purpose, however broadly specified. Viewed that way, the nondelegation
doctrine can be seen as a convenient way of illustrating the basic point that
regulatory statutes impose upon agencies duties to conform their conduct to
some principle or set of purposes. But that basic point is what the argument
requires, and it could be made without reference to the nondelegation
doctrine.
Second, one might object that it does not make sense to equate
principles (even a broad set of intelligible principles) with purposes or
ends. To respond to this objection, we do not need to distinguish between
principles and purposes at a high level of generality. It is enough to observe
that pursuing a principle—that is, trying to implement it, conform one’s
conduct to it, and respect it—can certainly be a purpose or end. What
makes principles into purposes in this statutory context is the obligation to
pursue them, to carry them forward. As a result, it is really the obligation
imposed on agencies, not the distinction between what might count as a
“principle” but not a “purpose,” that supports the inference that the
principles in regulatory statutes establish purposes for agencies.
B. The Character of the Agency’s Purposive Duty
The combination of these formal features of regulatory statutes
supplies administrative agencies with a distinctive duty. It is worth

97 Margaret Lemos has provocatively argued that once we recognize the lawmaking inherent in
most statutory interpretation, there should be a nondelegation doctrine for statutes administered by
courts. See Lemos, The Other Delegate, supra note 92, at 408, 422, 435–43 (arguing that delegations to
courts are just as much a concern as delegations to agencies).
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isolating the elements of this duty in the abstract before turning to illustrate
them in practice.
At a basic level, the agency’s duty is not simply to implement (go
make rules!), but to implement in furtherance of the principles or purposes
of the statute (go make rules to “protect[] the public against unreasonable
risk of accidents”98 or to protect consumers from “unfair, deceptive, or
abusive act[s] or practice[s]”99). The agency’s obligation to implement is
thus an obligation to conform its conduct in accordance with the purposes
Congress has established, and at a minimum, the intelligible principle that
validates the statute constitutionally.
This duty of implementation structures the agency’s reasoning in
concrete ways. First and most obviously, the agency must develop an
understanding of the principle or purposes the statute sets forth. That
understanding will depend upon the level of specificity or generality of the
statute, and the way in which the general aims of the statute interact with its
more specific provisions. But having identified the statute’s purposes or
principles, the agency has an obligation to do something with them.
Second, and in particular, it must evaluate alternatives in light of those
purposes, and, third, ultimately select an alternative that, other things equal,
best carries them forward. Of course, other things are rarely equal. Statutes
may narrowly prescribe the means available or put some purposes in
conflict with others. Directions from political supervisors can also reduce
the range of options available to the agency. But the core prima facie duty a
regulatory statute imposes is to carry forward its principles or purposes
within the means the statute permits—a duty I refer to as “the purposive
duty to implement.”
Notice that nothing said thus far commits the agency to any particular
approach to how it discerns its statute’s limiting principles or purposes.
That will frequently be a complex undertaking; the next Part provides an
account of how an agency may do so. The point here is the more basic and
fundamental one that discerning the statute’s purposes or principles and
seeking to implement them are necessary elements of the agency’s duty to
implement its statute.
But it should also be clear that this duty has important implications for
the role of law for the agency. By obliging the agency to conform its action
to a principle or purpose, the law does not inform the agency’s
decisionmaking only in a binary way—sorting actions into those that are
permitted and those that are prohibited, but otherwise leaving the agency
98
99

49 U.S.C. § 30102(a)(8) (2012).
12 U.S.C. § 5531(a) (2012).
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free to exercise its discretion. Rather, regulatory statutes impose
teleological obligations. They oblige agencies to pursue ends and
principles, and as a result, law continues to make demands on agencies’
reasoning even within the set of actions the law does not otherwise
prohibit. In short, for the agency’s implementation of regulatory statutes,
the law does not merely authorize and prohibit—it also guides.
C. Agency Examples
This basic structure of reasoning is a ubiquitous feature of agency
explanations of their decisions. Still it may be useful to briefly consider two
examples, one from a recent rulemaking and one from a recent formal
adjudication, to give a flavor for the way in which agencies exercise this
duty.
1. FCC Rulemaking.—A recent Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) rule on the volume of broadcast commercials provides
a nice illustration. In 2010, Congress enacted the Commercial
Advertisement Loudness Mitigation (CALM) Act, directing the FCC to
adopt rules that “prevent digital television commercial advertisements from
being transmitted at louder volumes than the program material they
accompany.”100 In the FCC’s rulemaking, industry commentators argued
that the requirements of uniform volume should apply only to
advertisements the distributors of digital television “inserted,” as opposed
to those advertisements that cable networks “embed” in programming that
they send to distributors.101 The FCC invoked the purposes of the Act to
resolve this issue:
Our conclusion that stations/[digital distributors] are responsible for
compliance with regard to “embedded” as well as “inserted”
commercials is consistent with Congressional intent as well as the
language of the statute and the RP [Recommend Practices developed
by industry standard setting body]. Examination of the legislative
history reflects that Congress’s purpose in regulating the volume of
audio on commercials was to “make the volume of commercials and
regular programming uniform so consumers can control sound levels.”
Our reading of the statute and the RP carries out this purpose by
requiring that all commercials transmitted by stations/[digital
distributors] comport with the RP, regardless of whether they are
“inserted” or “embedded.” The record reflects that most commercials
are not inserted in programming by stations/[digital distributors], but
rather upstream by broadcast or cable networks; in some cases, more
100 Implementation of the Commercial Advertisement Loudness Mitigation (CALM) Act, 77 Fed.
Reg. 40,276, 40,276 (July 9, 2012) (codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 73, 76).
101 See id. at 40,280–81.
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than 95% of the commercials transmitted are embedded within
programming when it is sent to stations/[digital distributors]. Our
interpretation carries out Congress’s purpose by requiring compliance
with the RP’s provisions uniformly for all commercials transmitted by
stations/[digital distributors], not just the minority they happen to
insert.102
This passage shows the agency articulating an understanding of the
statutory provision’s purpose and evaluating alternatives in light of that
purpose. In particular, the agency rejects limiting noise reduction to
commercials the distributor inserted into the programming in light of its
understanding the statute’s purpose of eliminating variations in the volume
of all commercials. Without this grounding in statutory purpose, the agency
would have had less reason to exercise its powers under the statute to
impose this obligation on distributors.
2. Department of Labor Formal Adjudication.—A recent decision of
the Administrative Review Board (the Board), the highest adjudicative
authority in the Department of Labor, nicely illustrates a purposive
approach within the context of a formal adjudication. An accountant,
Thomas Spinner, had been fired from his job with a private accounting firm
after he reported accounting problems in the books of a publicly traded
company.103 In the appeal of his retaliation complaint, the question the
Board faced was whether the whistleblower provisions of the Sarbanes–
Oxley Act of 2002104 provided protection from retaliation for an employee
of a contractor of a publicly traded company (like Spinner) or whether
those protections applied only to the employees of publicly traded
companies.105
The Board concluded that the protections applied to employees of
contractors as well as employees of publicly traded companies.106 The
Board first carefully examined the text of the provision, concluding that the
102

Id. at 40,280 (footnotes omitted).
Spinner v. David Landau & Assocs., 33 Individual Emp. Rts. Cases (BNA) 1755, at 2 (Dep’t. of
Labor May 31, 2012).
104 Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections
of the U.S. Code).
105 Spinner, 33 Individual Emp. Rts. Cases (BNA) at 3–4. Section 806 provides in relevant part:
WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION FOR EMPLOYEES OF PUBLICALLY TRADED COMPANIES.—No
company with a class of securities registered under section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 . . . or that is required to file reports under section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 . . . or any officer, employee, contractor, subcontractor, or agent of such company . . . may
discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, or in any other manner discriminate against an
employee in the terms and conditions of employment because of any lawful act done by the
employee . . . [such as providing information about violations of the securities laws].
18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
106 Spinner, 33 Individual Emp. Rts. Cases (BNA) at 16.
103
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more narrow reading would not be the most plausible,107 but allowing that
the provision had some ambiguity.108 The Board provided a detailed
analysis of the background of the enactment of the Act arising out of the
Enron scandal, and concluded that the Act’s purpose “to protect the
investing market and the employees who blow the whistle on issuer-related
activities” strongly supported the broader construction.109 After discussing
the Senate Committee Report on the Act, the Board reasoned that
construing the Act “as only protecting employees of publicly traded
companies would leave unprotected from retaliation outside accountants,
auditors, and lawyers, who are the most likely to uncover and comprehend
evidence of potential wrongdoing.”110 The broader construction, the Board
noted, also comported with longstanding Department of Labor precedent
that extended retaliation protection to employees of contractors under
analogous whistleblower protection provisions.111 For the Board, the
remedial purpose of the Act, combined with the longstanding parallel
practice under other whistleblower protection programs, overcame any
opposing inference from the section’s title, “Employees of Publically
Traded Companies.”112
The Board’s approach, carefully attentive to the meaning the text
would bear but also guided by the underlying purpose of the provision and
the larger policy landscape, illustrates the way in which assessments of
statutory purpose guide and ground agency decisionmaking, whether in
adjudication, rulemaking, or in other policymaking formats.113 While both

107

The Board reasoned that the narrower reading would limit the prohibition on retaliation to the
class of contractors and subcontractors who had the power to reinstate employees of the public
companies, a highly implausible restriction. See id. at 7.
108 Id. at 8–9.
109 Id. at 10.
110 Id. at 13.
111 Id. at 14.
112 See id. at 9 (discussing Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 806, 116 Stat. 745,
802)).
113 In Professor Christopher Walker’s recent empirical study of agency rule drafters, building on
Abbe Gluck and Lisa Bressman’s study of congressional staffers, see infra notes 136, 140, he asked 128
rule drafters whether they considered their approach to be “strong purposivist” (3%), “moderate
purposivist” (19%), “moderate textualist” (35%), or “strong textualist” (15%), with their response
percentages indicated in parenthesis. See Walker, supra note 49, at 1017. While this is useful in
understanding rule drafter’s interpretive self-identifications, without definitions of these various
positions as part of the survey prompt, the results do not contradict the claim here that purposive
interpretation is a ubiquitous feature of agency practice. Moreover, given that the conception of
purposivism identified here requires that the agency abide by the statutory text, all the responses other
than perhaps “strong textualist” could be conveying adherence to a purposivist approach, especially in
view of other findings of the study showing that (1) 76% concluded legislative history is a “useful tool
for interpreting statutes,” id. at 1038, and (2) 93% identified the purpose of legislative history as
“explain[ing] the purpose of the statute,” id. at 1040.
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of these examples involve agencies looking to legislative history, that is not
necessary to the purposive approach. As noted above, the priority of
purpose for the agency is a separate matter from how the agency discerns
purpose.
D. Reinforcement in Administrative Law
Fundamental doctrines of administrative law on the availability and
standard of review of agency action reflect and reinforce the agency’s duty
to implement the statutes it administers in a purposive way.
Administrative law has long since overcome the distinction Chief
Justice Marshall drew in Marbury v. Madison between, on the one hand,
those actions for which executive officers must “conform precisely to the
will of the President” and are “only politically examinable,” and, on the
other hand, ministerial duties, involving no discretion, and for which
judicial review is available.114 As Peter Strauss has pointed out, this
distinction “obscure[s] the vast middle ground that is the home of
administrative law.”115 A fundamental premise of contemporary
administrative law is that agencies are subject to judicial review for their
decisions, even when their decisions involve an exercise of discretion.116
Not only does administrative law make discretionary judgments by
agencies reviewable, it also requires some demonstration that the agency’s
action has a rational connection to the ends established by the statute.
Indeed, one of the most fundamental elements of arbitrary and capricious
review under § 706 of the APA is that the agency must make some
demonstration of the connection between its decision and the statute’s
aims. The canonical application of arbitrary and capricious review in the
State Farm117 decision illustrates this demand. Recall that in State Farm,
the Supreme Court concluded that the National Highway and Traffic Safety
Administration’s decision to rescind its prior rule requiring the installation
of passive restraints (such as air bags) in cars was arbitrary and
114

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 166 (1803).
Peter L. Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 965, 977 (1997).
116 See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012) (granting persons
adversely affected by administrative action judicial review thereof); Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S.
136, 140 (1967) (stating that APA § 702 creates a presumption of reviewability). The APA’s exclusion
of judicial review for actions that are “committed to agency discretion by law,” § 701(a)(2), does not
undermine this conclusion. That exception only applies “in those rare instances where ‘statutes are
drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply,’” Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971), or in which there is “no meaningful standard against
which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion,” Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985).
What that leaves available for review is the vast swath of administrative action where there is some
intelligible standard against which to judge the agency’s action.
117 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
115
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capricious.118 The purpose of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety
Act of 1966—to “reduce traffic accidents and deaths and injuries to persons
resulting from traffic accidents”119—was a central pillar of this analysis.
The agency had rescinded its passive restraint requirement without
devoting any analysis to retaining an airbag-only requirement,
notwithstanding its own prior conclusions that airbags were effective in
promoting the safety of vehicle occupants.120 The Supreme Court reasoned,
“[g]iven the effectiveness ascribed to airbag technology by the agency, the
mandate of the [Safety] Act to achieve traffic safety would suggest that the
logical response to the faults of detachable seatbelts would be to require the
installation of airbags.”121 The aim of the Act to promote occupant safety
was critical to the determination that the agency failed in its duties of
reasoned elaboration; it did not explain how its chosen course of action, in
view of its prior findings, furthered the “mandate” of the Act.
The agency’s duty to “cogently explain why it has exercised its
discretion in a given manner”122 thus includes a duty of connecting the
agency’s chosen course of action to the ends established by the act.123 To
comply with that duty, the agency needs to specify the ends of the statute.
As a result, arbitrary and capricious review can be seen as policing the
agency’s duty to implement the statute in a purposive manner.124
E. From Implementation to Interpretation
Thus far this Part has defended the premise—likely to be
commonplace to some and contested by others—that regulatory statutes
impose upon agencies a duty to implement them in a purposive manner.
The question, then, is what implications that duty to implement has for the
agencies’ interpretation of the statutes they administer? That is, to what
extent does the duty to implement commit an agency to interpret its statutes

118

Id. at 34.
Id. at 33. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1381 (1976) (repealed 1994)).
120 Id. at 48.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 See Gillian E. Metzger, Foreword: Embracing Administrative Common Law, 80 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1293, 1312 (2012) (arguing that arbitrariness review as interpreted by the courts is a form of
administrative common law and itself “resembles forms of purposivism that read statutes with an eye to
achieving some quite generalized policy goals”).
124 Interestingly, Congress has also imposed crosscutting analysis duties on agencies that augment
their express goal setting. See Government Performance and Results Modernization Act of 2010, Pub.
L. No. 111-352, 124 Stat. 3866 (2011) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code) (imposing a
cluster of requirements that the agency develop mission statements, general goals and objectives, and
performance plans that relate agency activities to its stated goals).
119
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in a particular manner? These questions raise the notoriously thorny
relationship between implementation and interpretation.
1. The Duty of Purposive Interpretation.—Perhaps the most
straightforward position on this question is that the duty to implement
commits the agency to a particular structure of practical reasoning.
Operationally, as noted in the previous Section, to comply with its duty to
implement, the agency must develop an understanding of the purposes of
the statute, evaluate alternatives in light of those purposes, and select a
course of action that, other things equal, best furthers those purposes within
the scope of textually permitted actions. This structure of practical
reasoning is the basic structure of reasoning that purposive interpretive
theories commend.125 In a sense, the point is that once this purposive duty
to implement is understood in these terms, it clearly commits the agency to
a purposive method of interpretation.
For many, this short answer will be sufficient. It reflects the widely
held view that implementation and interpretation are difficult to pull apart.
On this view, both interpretation and implementation describe the
processes by which agencies and courts specify the requirements of a
statute. Moreover, as Kent Greenawalt writes, “every agency-created rule
rests on some combination of interpretation and implementation.”126 To
make decisions about implementation, the agency must make interpretive
judgments. In particular, it must make judgments about its goals, the
limitations on its powers, the factors it may rely upon, the weight among
those factors, the level of certainty it should have about the likely
consequences of its action, the alternatives that are reasonable,127 and the
scope of its responsibility to accommodate different interests. These and
many other judgments are interpretive, and provide a framework of
practical reasoning within the agency, that is, a framework for evaluation of
the alternative courses for implementing the agency’s powers. For those
who lump interpretation and implementation together—pragmatically
treating the specification of the requirements of a statute as an
125 See Stack, Interpreting Regulations, supra note 27, at 384–88 (providing an account of Hart &
Sacks’s interpretive technique).
126 GREENAWALT, supra note 7, at 167.
127 See id. at 168 (noting that what may be reasonable under one interpretation may not be
reasonable under another). Professor Mashaw points out that implementation is an “instrumentally
rational exercise” in which the agency must determine its goals as well as the constraints that have been
placed on its development and implementation of policy. Jerry L. Mashaw, Agency-Centered or CourtCentered Administrative Law? A Dialogue with Richard Pierce on Agency Statutory Interpretation,
59 ADMIN. L. REV. 889, 898 (2007). Those questions are “saturated with interpretive issues,” and more
generally, “[t]he notion that policy choice is not interpretive simply ignores many of the necessary
mental operations involved in administrative implementation.” Id. Interpretation is called for in judging
the reasonable.
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“interpretation”—there is little reason to object to the idea that a duty to
implement commits the agency to an interpretive stance: If interpretation
saturates implementation, then a duty to implement a statute in a particular
way would also involve interpretive commitments.
Others draw a sharp distinction between agency interpretation and
agency implementation.128 In this vein, Richard Pierce emphasizes that to
interpret means to explain the meaning of a statute, and argues that
interpretation is a fair description of what a court (or an agency) would do
in the first step of the Chevron analysis.129 But, Pierce argues, the second
step of Chevron “does not instruct or authorize agencies to ‘interpret’
statutes in any way that fits within the dictionary definition of
‘interpret.’”130 Rather, for Pierce, making an institutional choice among a
range of options can “only [be] engaging in a policymaking process.”131
There are two different types of responses. The first, which takes the
objection head-on, reasserts that conceptually and practically it does not
make sense to distinguish agency implementation and interpretation
because interpretation is so infused in implementation that they cannot be
usefully pulled apart and the ultimate object of interest is how the statute is
specified by the court or agency. The second line of response concedes
that, at the extremes, one might distinguish some tasks as purely
policymaking, and even that some duties to implement do not carry with
them interpretive commitments. But that concession alone does not pose an
objection to the claim here that the purposive duty to implement is the kind
of duty that involves interpretive commitments.

128

See Pierce, supra note 53, at 199–200.
Id. at 199.
130 Id. at 200.
131 Id. In a similar vein, Elizabeth Foote argues that the Chevron framework mistakenly treats
administrative action as statutory construction, suggestive of judicial-style methodologies for affixing
meaning to a statutory text, as opposed to reviewing agency action for whether it was a sound or
nonarbitrary exercise of administrative power. Foote argues that categorizing agency action as primarily
a matter of statutory construction ignores the distinctive influences, from political pressures to the
extensive reliance on experts, which shape the agency’s decisionmaking process. See Elizabeth V.
Foote, Statutory Interpretation or Public Administration: How Chevron Misconceives the Function of
Agencies and Why It Matters, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 673, 691–703 (2007); see also Michael Herz,
Deference Running Riot: Separating Interpretation and Lawmaking under Chevron, 6 ADMIN. L.J. AM.
U. 187, 190–99 (1992) (arguing that Chevron commands deference to agency lawmaking, not agency
interpretation, and that when an agency acts pursuant to a delegation of lawmaking power,
interpretation is “merely to define the boundaries of the zone of indeterminacy” for the agency). One
could agree with the analysis that too much agency action is reviewed through the lens of judicial tools
of statutory construction without taking the further position that implementation is not interpretive. In
other words, one could embrace the general critique that too much of what agencies do is understood by
courts to be analogous to (and perhaps a poor exemplar of) judicial construction of statutes without
denying the point that implementation involves interpretive choices at many turns.
129
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2. Evidence from Congress.—It is also useful to ask what evidence
there is that Congress makes a distinction between implementation and
interpretation. Congress attends to whether it charges courts or agencies
with power to administer a statute,132 and also is sensitive to the design,
processes, and modes of accountability when it delegates to an agency.133
But, perhaps to the disappointment of legal scholars, Congress has shown a
notorious disinterest in the allocation of interpretive authority between
courts and agencies.134 Outside of an occasional bill introduced to overrule
aspects of Chevron, legislation rarely expressly addresses whether the
delegation of lawmaking power carries with it a delegation of interpretive
authority, as the Chevron doctrine presumes.135
Abbe Gluck and Lisa Bressman’s recent empirical study of
congressional committee staff provides support for the long-held but little
documented surmise that Congress does not show independent interest in
the allocation of interpretive authority between courts and agencies because
it treats that question as part and parcel of the underlying delegation. Gluck
and Bressman’s study shows that committee staffers are generally aware
of136 and draft delegations to agencies in light of Chevron.137 Particularly
interesting for our purposes here, Bressman and Gluck’s study confirms
that when Congress delegates power to an agency to make law, it intends to
grant the agency interpretive authority, that is, authority to give the statute
meaning in ways that will not be questioned de novo by courts.138 Their
study thus provides specific support for the idea that Congress views the
delegation of interpretive authority as incidental to the vesting of powers in
the agency. And particularly on point for our purposes, they find that
committee staffers do not “distinguish between interpretive authority and
implementation authority.”139 Indeed, Bressman and Gluck report that their
132

See Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislative Allocation of Delegated Power: Uncertainty, Risk, and
the Choice Between Agencies and Courts, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1035, 1039–49 (2006) (providing an
overview of the choice to delegate to agencies or courts).
133 See DAVID E. LEWIS, PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF AGENCY DESIGN: POLITICAL
INSULATION IN THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACY, 1946–1997, at 3–16 (2003)
(providing an overview of literature on the politics of agency design).
134 See Kent Barnett, Codifying Chevmore, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 6 (2015).
135 Interestingly, in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Congress
codified a version of the Skidmore standard of judicial review. See 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(5)(A) (2012)
(specifying a standard, largely tracking Skidmore’s, for review of the OCC’s preemption
determinations); see Barnett, supra note 134, at 26–33.
136 Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An
Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901,
928–29 (2013).
137 Id. at 941.
138 See Bressman & Gluck, supra note 18, at 769–70.
139 Id. at 769.
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respondents “told [them] that they expected those kinds of gaps to be filled
by agencies—and they did not distinguish between the agency as
interpreter or implementer.”140 This study thus provides some empirical
support for the position that when Congress grants lawmaking powers to
agencies, it does not generally distinguish between the power to implement
the statute and the power to interpret it.
In sum, regulatory statutes impose a purposive obligation upon
agencies—an obligation that structures agencies’ practical reasoning—to
implement but also to interpret them in a purposivist manner. This account
of the agency’s duties is reflected in agency practice, foundational
doctrines of administrative law, and congressional staffers’ own
understanding of what Congress does when it delegates authority to
agencies.
III. AGENCY PURPOSIVISM AND RESPONSE TO CRITICS
The thrust of the argument thus far has been formal; it has isolated and
described a statutory duty to implement and interpret statutes in a
purposivist manner and suggested that the duty is reflected in fundamental
doctrines of administrative law and recent evidence of Congress’s
practices. While this takes a critical step forward in identifying the grounds
and overall orientation of agency statutory interpretation, it does not defend
its workability in practice or suggest how the approach might be specified.
Even those persuaded by this formal argument will want some reassurance
that the tasks it imposes on the agency are achievable. Others will view
interpretive choices as fundamentally about practical or institutional
considerations.141
This Part defends the practicality of this approach by arguing that
agencies’ institutional capacities make them particularly well positioned to
exercise the functions that a purposive approach requires. It does so by
examining agencies’ capacity to apply the classic technique of purposive
interpretation set forth by Henry Hart and Albert Sacks in The Legal
Process.142 There are several reasons for specifying the approach with
reference to Hart and Sacks’s theory even though courts were their primary
focus. First, Hart and Sacks’s account of purposivism still provides the

Id. at 770. Congressional staffers “made no distinction, as some scholars have, between agency
statutory ‘implementation’ and agency statutory ‘interpretation.’” Id. at 765.
141 See Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Private Law in the Gaps, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1689, 1741–42
(2014) (“Legal process theorists aspire to match decisionmaking authority with competence in defining
the procedures due for resolving particular questions.”).
142 See HART & SACKS, supra note 12.
140
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classic statement of the theory.143 Second, a generation of criticism of
purposivism—first from legal realists and then from textualists and public
choice theorists—is primarily directed toward Hart and Sacks’s
conception.144 A defense of purposivism, even for agencies, needs to
confront those critiques. So while the agency’s basic purposive duty could
be specified in ways that do not follow the outlines of Hart and Sacks’s
approach, their theory provides an appropriate starting point and foil. After
the institutional competence discussion, this Part responds to textualist
challenges to agency purposivism, and to the objection that Congress does
not have the constitutional authority to direct an agency’s interpretive
method.
A. Agencies and Purposivist Interpretation
Hart and Sacks’s “technique” of statutory interpretation has four basic
elements, which track the definition of purposivism provided at the outset:
the court is to (1) “[d]ecide what purpose ought to be attributed to the
statute and to any subordinate provision of it,” (2) “[i]nterpret the words of
the statute immediately in question so as to carry out [that] purpose as best
it can,” (3) make sure not to give the words “a meaning they will not bear,”
and finally, (4) not “violate any established policy of clear statement.”145
Hart and Sacks provide a careful elaboration of the interpretive operations
and sources involved in each of these steps.146 Assessment of agencies’
institutional capacities suggests that they are not only better equipped than
courts to implement this basic technique of interpretation, but they are the
institutions in our constitutional scheme that are distinctively qualified to
do so.
1. Discerning Purpose.—How the interpreter “attributes” purposes to
a statute and its subordinate provisions constitutes “[t]he principal problem
in the development of a workable technique of interpretation,”147 and a
principal focus of criticism of Hart and Sacks’s theory. Hart and Sacks’s
approach to attributing purposes is frequently taken to be reducible to their
counsel that the court should “assume, unless the contrary unmistakably
appears, that the legislature was made up of reasonable persons pursuing

143
144

Manning, What Divides, supra note 26, at 86.
See, e.g., id. at 86–87 (using Hart and Sacks’s work as the “main point of departure” for his own

work).
145

HART & SACKS, supra note 12, at 1374.
See Stack, Interpreting Regulations, supra note 27, at 384–88 (offering an account of Hart &
Sacks’s interpretive technique).
147 HART & SACKS, supra note 12, at 1125.
146

905

STACK (DO NOT DELETE)

11/10/2015 4:40 PM

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

reasonable purposes reasonably.”148 Taking that rationalist, constructive
attitude as the defining or exclusive way in which Hart and Sacks advise an
interpreter to discern purpose exposes their theory to a host of objections.
Based on public choice theory, scholars have argued that this reflects “an
unreasonably optimistic view” of the legislature.149 More generally,
scholars argue that even if legislatures did seek to achieve reasonable
outcomes through legislation, focusing on that point would not give useful
guidance to interpreters.150 As I have emphasized in other writing, this
understanding misreads Hart and Sacks.151 Far from launching the court
into a freewheeling reconstruction of a reasonable legislative purpose as the
first and primary step of discerning legislative purpose, Hart and Sacks
describe the task of attributing purpose to a statute or its provisions as
having two sequential steps. The first step in attributing purpose is for the
court to consider any “formally enacted statement of purpose.”152 So long
as the enacted statement is designed to shed light on interpretation, is
consistent with the text, and pertains to the question at issue, the court
should “accept[]” the formally enacted statement of purpose.153 This first
step is critical. By accepting Congress’s own statement of purpose, the
court grants a very strong form of deference to Congress’s own articulation
of the purpose of the statute. For Hart and Sacks, it is only after the court
has determined that such an enacted statement of purpose is not available
or not useful that it must engage in the more abstract inquiry of “inferring
purpose.”154
Agencies are far better positioned than courts to discern statutory
purposes. Michael Herz provides an elegant argument for agencies’
superior institutional competence to discern statutory purposes.155 Herz
proceeds by distinguishing two cases. In the first, Congress has been
relatively specific as to the purpose of the statute. In this case, it would not
be a hard question whether, even under our relaxed nondelegation doctrine,

148

Id. at 1378.
Manning, What Divides, supra note 26, at 102; see also Nourse, supra note 18, at 81–85.
150 See Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and
the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 193 (1986).
151 See Stack, Interpreting Regulations, supra note 27, at 384–88. In Interpreting Regulations, I
argue that agency regulations should be interpreted in light of their statements of basis and purpose,
which form the bulk of the regulations’ preambles. I argue that correcting this misreading of Hart and
Sacks exposes how this approach draws upon their reliance on enacted statements of purpose in
interpreting statutes. Id.
152 HART & SACKS, supra note 12, at 1377.
153 Id.
154 See id.
155 Herz, supra note 8, at 96–98.
149
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Congress has supplied the agency with an intelligible principle to guide its
actions. In this case, discerning purpose is more a matter of “finding” than
attributing. In these circumstances, the agency has no disadvantage to a
court in discerning purpose. To the extent statutory purpose is discernible
from statutory text (including enacted statements of purpose), agencies and
courts have equal access to it, and agencies have the advantage of having
more than sporadic encounters with the statutes they administer. To the
extent statutory purpose is gleaned in part from nontextual sources,
agencies have an even clearer advantage. Unlike courts, as noted in Part I,
agencies have frequently “lived” the process of statutory drafting, have
access to congressional overseers, and must make credible representations
as to the compromises the legislation embodies. As a result, if statutory
purpose is relatively clear, whether gleaned exclusively from statutory text
or from bringing in a more general array of sources, agencies have equal or
better capacities than courts.
But Congress frequently delegates broadly to agencies, establishing
statutory purposes at a high level of generality. In this second case, the task
of developing a working understanding of the statute’s purposes will
involve a wide range of judgments, which, as Herz argues, “the agency is
in a far better position . . . than is a court”156 to make. The reasons go
directly to familiar differences in institutional competences between
agencies and courts, in terms of expertise and the political role and
responsiveness of agencies,157 rationales that also undergird the
presumption of judicial deference to agencies under Chevron.158 Unlike
courts, agencies are specialists. Agencies can focus on designated areas,
developing experience and expertise in those regulatory environments.
They of course also have specialized staff, including staff capacities for
investigation and technical analysis.
At the same time, agencies are also constantly engaged with political
actors.159 “In the interpretation and implementation of statutes, which are
majoritarian . . . and subject to legislative amendment,” as Herz observes,
“a connection to current political and societal preferences is a strength.”160
156

Id. at 97.
Id.
158 Id.
159 As Jerry Mashaw observes, it “is precisely [agencies’] job as agents of past congresses and
sitting politicians to synthesize the past with the present.” Mashaw, Norms, supra note 3, at 513. See
also Edward Rubin, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, ISSUES IN LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP, Nov. 2002, art. 2, http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/ils.2002.2.issue-2/ils.2002.2.2.1021/
ils.2002.2.2.1021.xml [http://perma.cc/EE5E-2KYC] (arguing that the point of delegating to an agency
is to invite them to mediate between past legal language and present concerns).
160 Herz, supra note 8, at 97–98.
157
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The same is true for statutes with conflicting purposes, or purposes at
different levels of generality that are in tension with one another. In sum, if
the task of discerning a purpose is more constructive than “finding,” the
task is one that will involve making value choices as well as exercising
expert judgment. In both respects, agencies have decisive advantages over
courts.161 Indeed, the particular combination of political responsiveness and
legal and policy expertise makes agencies uniquely well situated to mediate
between broad statutory language and the preferences of contemporary
politics in specifying the statutes’ purposes or principles in a set of concrete
guidelines.
2. Carrying Forward Purposes.—Agencies are also better equipped
than courts at selecting the best means of implementation, including when
there are tensions in the goals of the statute. Hart and Sacks’s command to
select actions that “best carry out”162 statutory purpose(s) has always had a
somewhat awkward fit for courts; on its face, it suggests an activist
conception of the judicial role, with the court seeking to make wideranging policy determinations.
In contrast, supplying the agency with a duty to select a course of
action that “best carries out” the aims of the statute is an uncontroversial
directive. As suggested by the statutory arguments in Part II, Congress
obliges agencies to be active to implement statutory purposes. Moreover,
agencies are concededly lawmaking bodies, a concession that remains
uncomfortable for some as to courts.163 Perhaps more important, the broad
range of synthetic judgments involved in selecting a course that “best
carries out” a statute are precisely the kinds of judgments regulatory
statutes require agencies to make, and go directly to agencies’ relative
competence. Selecting that course of action requires understanding the
operational context of the area of regulation, for which agencies have a
distinct advantage over courts. For instance, to return to the FCC regulation
on the volume of commercials discussed above, the agency must know it is
technically possible for a cable provider to modulate the volume of
advertisements that it inserts into programing as well as those that come
embedded in programming from national networks. In addition, the agency
161

See Diver, supra note 15, at 583–85 (“Whether one takes a democratic or technocratic view of
social policymaking, administrative agencies, with their greater political accountability and research
tools, seem to be more appropriate vehicles for making [the value choices inherent in interpretation].”);
Eskridge, Expanding Chevron’s Domain, supra note 8, at 423–26 (noting that agencies are more
competent to make political decisions than courts in view of their greater political accountability).
162 HART & SACKS, supra note 12, at 1312.
163 Cf. Lemos, The Other Delegate, supra note 92, at 434–43 (suggesting that despite widespread
acknowledgment that courts engage in some policymaking when interpreting statutes, judicial doctrines
do not police the scope of delegation of these lawmakings to courts as such).
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is in a better position to know about the state of the industry, the scope of
its reliance on advertisers, and the economic impact of this new rule. More
generally, the point is that the agency is in a better position to make those
determinations—and scores like them—than a court.
Decisions about implementation also implicate questions of politics.
For instance, which industry, or facility, should be the first to comply with
a safety standard, at what level, and over what time period? On these
issues, the agency’s greater political accountability is an asset. That
advantage is augmented by the agency’s options for vetting its proposed
implementations. Most obviously, notice-and-comment rulemaking
requires a public vetting of the agency’s proposed interpretation and
implementation of the law.164 This allows for input from a wide variety of
sources in a way that can facilitate transparent policymaking and reasoned
deliberation about the consequences of proposed policies. Courts have no
similar mechanism for notice-and-comment on their proposed judgments.165
In sum, agencies’ familiar institutional differences from courts—their
expertise, accountability, and procedural flexibility—constitute advantages
over courts for the difficult but unavoidable tasks of determining how to
best carry forward statutory purposes.
3. Consistent with Text and Other Binding Norms.—For Hart and
Sacks, statutory text serves a dual role.166 On the one hand, it constitutes a
central source for inferring purpose.167 But statutory text also operates as a
separate constraint. The “court ought never to give the words of a statute a
meaning they will not bear,”168 and may infer a reasonable purpose for the
legislation “unless the contrary unmistakably appears.”169 In this second
role, statutory text is understood to establish a set of permissible
interpretations or outside parameters, but not to decisively compel
meanings.170 Accordingly, Hart and Sacks counsel that dictionaries and

164

See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).
See Michael Abramowicz & Thomas B. Colby, Notice-and-Comment Judicial Decisionmaking,
76 U. CHI. L. REV. 965, 967–69 (2009) (noting absence of opportunity for public comment on judicial
decisions before issuance in the federal courts, and arguing that the case for notice-and-comment in the
judiciary is just as strong in many respects as it is for administrative agencies); see also Richard A.
Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, Notice-and-Comment Sentencing, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1, 5 (2012)
(arguing that notice-and-comment provides a fruitful analogy for enhancing participation in sentencing
as well as for informing prosecutors’ charge and plea bargain decisionmaking).
166 See HART & SACKS, supra note 12, at 1375 (describing “The Double Role of the Words as
Guides to Interpretation”).
167 Id. at 1377.
168 Id. at 1375.
169 Id. at 1378.
170 Id. at 1191.
165
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canons of semantic construction should only be relied upon to understand
the range of permissible meanings, not to fix any particular meaning.171
With regard to agencies’ own capacities to assess whether their
actions fall within the range of permissible understandings of the powers
granted by statute, several contrasting considerations are at play. On the
one hand, agencies have specialized commitments, and “an agent with a
specific substantive commitment may go further than its more neutral
principal would approve” in implementing its specific end.172 By taking
statutory purpose as the lodestar of interpretation, especially when situated
within an institution committed to those ends, the agency may “lose sight
of Congress’s choice of means.”173 Agencies may also face greater political
incentives than courts to push the boundaries of Congress’s choice of
words to implement statutory ends. On the other hand, agencies’ greater
familiarity with the statutes they administer makes them more expert at
determining their scope. Further, to the extent agency action is challenged
in court, agencies face reversal if they do not heed how a court is likely to
define what the statute permits. The process of regulatory review also
frequently involves vetting agencies’ construction of their statutes through
an institution with distinct and more general incentives, such as with the
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA).174 Exactly how one
balances these countervailing considerations depends on one’s perspective
and the context. Surely agencies sometimes do push beyond the boundaries
of their authority as judged by courts. But just as clearly, agencies also
have the institutional capacities to assess the boundaries of their statutory
authority175 and strong incentives to accurately do so. (Indeed, if they did
not have this basic capacity, it is hard to imagine that a direction to the
agency to consider only statutory text would be the right remedy.)
Finally, it is worth noting that for the agency, statutory text is not the
only source of binding constraint. Because agencies are part of the
Executive Branch, they must obey binding executive orders directing how
171 See Stack, Interpreting Regulations, supra note 27, at 386–87 (describing role of text for Hart
and Sacks); Manning, New Purposivism, supra note 27, at 148 (defending the consistency of textually
structured purposivism within the Legal Process tradition, especially in view of its commitment to the
principle of institutional settlement).
172 Herz, supra note 8, at 105.
173 Id. at 104 (emphasis removed); see, e.g., North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 906–11 (D.C.
Cir. 2008).
174 See Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths
and Realities, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1871–72 (2013) (noting that OIRA is part of the White House,
and that it seeks a wide variety of expert analysis from within the Executive Branch in conducting
regulatory review).
175 See Walker, supra note 49, at 1019 fig.1 (reporting survey results showing agency rule drafters’
knowledge of norms of textual analysis).
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they bring their statutes into effect.176 This too can be explained by Hart and
Sacks’s theory. For Hart and Sacks, the checking role of statutory text
follows from a more basic commitment, which they call the principle of
institutional settlement. “[I]nstitutional settlement expresses the judgment
that decisions which are the duly arrived at result of duly established
procedures of this kind ought to be accepted as binding upon the whole
society unless and until they are duly changed.”177 For Hart and Sacks, the
principle of institutional settlement explains why courts should pay careful
attention to statutory text. For agencies, it also explains why they need to
heed other binding sources, such as executive orders.
Complying with executive orders is also within the agency’s
competence. To the extent that the task is to interpret the public text of an
executive order, agency lawyers are as well positioned as any legal
interpreter. Moreover, to the extent the order is supplemented by
interpretive guidance, agency counsels are experts in administrative law,
and have ready access to executive branch lawyers, from whom they may
seek definitive executive branch interpretations.178
4. Consistent with Background and Constitutional Norms.—The
final step in Hart and Sacks’s purposive approach is to ensure that the
prospective interpretation does not “violate any established policy of clear
statement.”179 These policies include criminal prohibitions not thought to be
morally blameworthy,180 departures from generally accepted policy, and
constitutional questions.181 Hart and Sacks instruct the interpreter to read
statutes in ways that do not impinge upon these policies and principles,
unless the legislature “speak[s] with more than [the] ordinary clearness” on
the issue.182
An established strain of American legal thought, clearly represented in
Alexander Bickel’s The Least Dangerous Branch,183 understands federal

176 I offer an account of the conditions under which an executive order is binding in Kevin M.
Stack, The President’s Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 263, 312–16
(2006) [hereinafter Stack, Statutory Powers].
177 HART & SACKS, supra note 12, at 4.
178 See Sunstein, supra note 174, at 1872 (noting OIRA’s legal review of agency statutory
constructions).
179 HART & SACKS, supra note 12, at 1374.
180 Id. at 1376–77.
181
Id. at 1377.
182 Id.; see Ernest A. Young, The Continuity of Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation: An
Essay for Phil Frickey, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1371, 1383–86 (2010) (describing the role of background
constitutional norms for legal process thinkers).
183 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR
OF POLITICS (2d ed. 1986).
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courts as having distinctive capacities as guardians of enduring,
background values. “[E]lected institutions are ill fitted, or not so well fitted
as the courts,” as Bickel writes in this vein, “to support and maintain
enduring general values.”184 For Bickel, the relative insulation of the courts
from politics makes them the best institutions to defend matters of
principle.185 Others have argued that courts have particular advantages over
agencies in careful application of the common law.186
While it makes sense to concede Bickel’s point that the insulation of
federal courts makes them particularly well suited to take unpopular
positions of principle, and to acknowledge that courts have greater reason
for care with the common law, agencies still have sufficient and even some
special capacities to ensure that their policies comply with background
values, including constitutional law. While this is not the place to engage in
a full exploration of the capacities of agencies to interpret the Constitution
or background values, it is worth isolating a few features of agencies that
suggest their competence to constrain their own choices in light of
constitutional or other background values. Many of these competences are
highlighted in recent work on “administrative constitutionalism.”187 First
and at a most basic level, constitutional interpretation is an unavoidable
feature of agency action and a necessary feature of our constitutional
structure.188 As Gillian Metzger writes, the obligation of agencies to take
constitutional norms seriously “can be inferred simply from the structure of
our constitutional order, under which the Constitution governs all exercises
of government authority.”189 There are also well-established institutions
within the Executive Branch for vetting issues of constitutional

184

Id. at 27.
See id. at 26–27.
186 See Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Reason and Reasonableness in Review of Agency Decisions,
104 NW. U. L. REV. 799, 833 (2010) (arguing that “[a]gencies are less likely than courts . . . to be
concerned [with] careful application of common law”).
187 For a helpful exploration of the challenges and capacities of agencies to engage in constitutional
implementation, see Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Constitutionalism, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1897 (2013)
[hereinafter Metzger, Administrative Constitutionalism]. For nuanced case studies of agency practices
implementing the Constitution, see, for example, Sophia Z. Lee, Race, Sex, and Rulemaking:
Administrative Constitutionalism and the Workplace, 1960 to the Present, 96 VA. L. REV. 799 (2010),
which explores ways in which the NLRB and FCC interpreted the Constitution in ways that extend
beyond judicial doctrines, and Jeremy K. Kessler, The Administrative Origins of Modern Civil Liberties
Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1083 (2014), which excavates the civil-libertarian rights enforcement in the
War Department.
188 See Lee, supra note 187, at 886 (noting that an agency’s interpretation of the Constitution is an
ineluctable feature of an agency’s exercise of its constitutional powers).
189 Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional Common Law, 110 COLUM.
L. REV. 479, 522 (2010).
185
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interpretation.190 As to agencies’ capacities, as Metzger emphasizes,
agencies’ expertise regarding their statutory powers better equips them to
“integrat[e] constitutional concerns” within their statutory schemes, as well
as to comprehend the effects “and thus . . . constitutional significance” of
their actions.191 In a similar vein, as Kenneth Bamberger argues, those same
virtues justify the use of normative canons of constructions by agencies;
agencies have unique capacities for comprehending the “factual details
underpinning the constitutional implications of particular policies.”192
Further, to the extent these constitutional issues and normative canons
involve questions of fundamental values, one could view the agency’s
greater political responsiveness as a benefit.193 As noted above, agencies
constantly engage with both political overseers and the public.194 The
procedural forms of agency action also facilitate this interaction and
monitoring. They can affirmatively attempt to elicit the concerns of
affected groups, just as they are required to consult with state and local
authorities on the federalism implications of their regulations.195 They can
affirmatively notify Congress and the public when they explicitly invoke
normative canons or other background values in their interpretations.196
Established structures of agency reason giving facilitate monitoring by
political actors and the public.197
In sum, the very institutional capacities of agencies touted above also
bear on their capacities to constrain their discretion in accordance with
background norms, whether from constitutional sources or otherwise. In
these respects, one can acknowledge the courts’ superior common law
capacities and that the insulation of federal courts gives them unique
protection from politics and thus the prospect for enforcing unpopular
matters of principle while still acknowledging that agencies are both

190 See Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1688, 1709–21 (2011)
(reviewing BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2010) and
providing an overview and defense of the Office of Legal Counsel’s capacity for independent legal
advice, including on constitutional questions).
191 Metzger, Administrative Constitutionalism, supra note 187, at 1922–23.
192 Kenneth A. Bamberger, Normative Canons in the Review of Administrative Policymaking,
118 YALE L.J. 64, 96–97 (2008).
193 See id.
194 See Metzger, Administrative Constitutionalism, supra note 187, at 1928–29 (comparing
agencies’ constant interaction with public and political entities with the courts’ “often attenuated and
episodic” interactions); see also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF
STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 12–18 (2010) (highlighting public and political
interactions with agencies as a virtue for administrative implementation of constitutional values).
195 See Bamberger, supra note 192, at 99–100.
196 Id. at 98–99.
197 Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundation of Chenery, 116 YALE L.J. 952, 993–96 (2007).
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capable and, in some respects, uniquely well situated to understand the
bearing of background policies on their actions.
*

*

*

This Section has argued that agencies have the institutional capacities
to undertake purposive statutory interpretation, and specifically the
purposive technique Hart and Sacks elaborated for courts. This suggests
that the formal obligation to implement and interpret statutes in a purposive
manner, defended in Part II, relies upon institutional capacities that
agencies have. It is now time to respond to objections to this approach
based on textualist and separation of powers concerns.
B. Purposivism v. Textualism Beyond the Courts
Textualists have offered significant challenges to purposivism, and in
particular to Hart and Sacks’s legal process conception. With a few
exceptions, the focus has been on judicial statutory interpretation. It is
worth highlighting how the arguments made thus far address the most
prominent challenges that might be raised to agency purposivism.
1. Coherence of Purpose.—Textualists challenge the coherence of
statutory purpose. Based on the premise that Congress is a multimember
body and different legislators have different purposes for enacting
legislation, textualists argue that legislation frequently lacks an agreedupon purpose.198 If much legislation does not have a coherent purpose,
textualists point out that it does not make sense to make discerning purpose
a central feature of the interpretive task.
One response is that to be constitutionally valid, regulatory statutes
must supply the agency with a purpose or purposes; as argued above, the
nondelegation doctrine requires that these statutes include an intelligible
principle to which the agency must conform its conduct, and that obligation
gives the agency a purpose or purposes. This answer emphasizes the
constitutional distinctiveness of regulatory statutes. To this, a textualist
might reply that to the extent the approach merely requires an agency to
discern the meaning of enacted indications of purpose, he or she has no
objection. But this is a significant concession in light of the argument in
198

Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 547–48 (1983) (noting that it
is difficult “to aggregate [individual [legislators’ views] into a coherent collective choice”); John F.
Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2410–13 (2003) (exploring the issue in
terms of interest group theory and social choice theory). See generally Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is
a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992)
(describing legislative intent as “meaningless”).
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Part II above. Part II sought to show that there is a broad class of statutes—
regulatory statutes—for which it is coherent to talk about their purposes, at
least as indicated by their text. If a textualist accepts that argument, then the
question pivots from whether purpose is coherent to other more practical
objections about what other sources come to bear on determining purposes,
and how dynamic the understanding of purpose can be.
2. The Priority of Purpose.—Even if textualists concede that
regulatory statutes include text that establishes the agency’s purpose(s),
textualists may still object to prioritizing consistency with purpose among
all the considerations that bear on the agency. What gives purpose such a
strong hold on the agency’s interpretative calculus? Answering this
challenge illuminates fundamental differences between purposivism and
textualism.
Statutory text has a very different place for textualists and
purposivists. Textualism resolves interpretive issues by seeking to discern
the best interpretation of the text within its semantic context. Textualism
has an intrinsic interest in statutory text in the sense that it is the exclusive
subject and source for interpretation. Purposivism, in contrast, looks to
statutory text instrumentally. For purposivists of the legal process strain,
the text is the best evidence of statutory purpose as well as a constraint on
the scope of permissible interpretations. The text thus informs and
establishes outer boundaries, but the text is neither the exclusive source nor
exclusive subject of interpretation.
This different orientation to statutory text has implications for how
textualists and purposivists engage in reading statutory text. Because
textualists focus on statutory text as the exclusive object of interpretation,
they have difficulty distinguishing particular portions of a statute as
particularly important to understanding the statute. In a sense, because
enactedness is what makes the text the object of interpretation for
textualists, textualism treats all statutory text uniformly and as equally
bearing on the meaning of all other parts of the text. Purposivism has a less
catholic approach to text. A basic command of purposivism is to prioritize
particular features of the statutory text that establishes the aims of the
statute or its provisions and to interpret other provisions in light of those
purposes.
So why, then, should an agency follow the purposivist in prioritizing
particular features of statutory text as opposed to adopting the more
uniform approach to text of the textualist? The reason is that purposivism
better fits the basic interpretive circumstances of the agency. To see this,
consider the very different models of practical reasoning that textualism
and purposivism supply the interpreter. A textualist has a clear practical
915

STACK (DO NOT DELETE)

11/10/2015 4:40 PM

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

directive: Discern the objective public meaning of the words the legislature
enacted as best understood in their context.199 While textualists
acknowledge that an agency may consult the purpose as discernible from
allowable sources,200 purpose is, at most, one among many considerations
and sources of inference about the meaning of text; it has no particular
priority. Purposivists, in contrast, supply the interpreter with a teleological
directive: Look to the statute with an eye to determining its purpose, or the
purposes of its provisions. The interpreter is then to check prospective
constructions that carry forward that purpose with respect to a wide variety
of constraints, including whether it is a permissible construction of the text
and consistent with background constitutional values and policies. At each
step in the interpretive process, the purpose or purposes of the statute
guides the choice of interpretive outcome.
These differences in practical reasoning required by purposivism and
textualism reveal a critical deficit for textualism as an approach to agency
statutory interpretation. While statutory text is certainly the primary
interpretive object for agencies, both for discerning purpose and the scope
of their powers, textualism does not supply a structure of practical
reasoning that fits the agency’s circumstances. As noted above, textualism
has no intrinsic interest in aims or purposes, whether of the statute as a
whole, a statutory title, or a particular provision. Its essential command is
the more minimalist one: Heed the meaning of the enacted text. For a court
faced with a proposed or actual construction of a statute, this minimalist
command provides a workable structure of reasoning for setting the
boundaries on what is permissible.
But for an agency or other executive actor, this counsel stops too
short; the agency frequently must select a course of action among a range
of textually plausible and attractive alternatives. The textualist command to
heed the text provides the agency no reason to select among alternatives
that are equally plausible under the text. Purposivism does. It provides a
criterion for the agent to invoke in selecting a course of action among those
that are textually permissible: Further the statute’s ends. Developing a
conception of the statute’s ends and evaluating alternatives in relation to
them gives agencies grounds to act nonarbitrarily in exercising discretion.
As a result, purposes should have priority for the agency, not only because
Congress requires them to, but also because granting them priority supplies
an account of practical reasoning that better fits and explains the agency’s
operational needs to act nonarbitrarily.

199
200
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3. Discerning Purpose.—Even if a textualist acknowledges the
operational need for an agency to prioritize purpose, a textualist might
object that purposes are frequently stated in such broad terms in statutes
that they are difficult to discern and specify. More pointedly, the objection
is that the statutory statement of purposes or principles is often so broadly
stated, or stated in ways that involve contradictions, that specifying what
they mean inevitably involves policy choice. The response to these points
is two-fold, and draws heavily on the arguments made earlier in this Part.
First, there is no reason to think that the task of discerning statutory
purposes will be an easy one. Second, to the extent it involves policy
choice as part of the elaboration of vaguely worded statutory purposes in
the contemporary political milieu, the agency stands in a very different
position than a court. A central thrust of the argument in this Part is that
agencies have stronger functional capacities than courts to specify broad
purposes. Moreover, as also suggested above, agency knowledge of the
politics of their statutes, as well as their expertise, means that they are less
subject to the error risks that might arise for courts with the task of
discerning or specifying a broad and ambiguous statement of purpose or
principle.
4. The Generality Problem.—One of the strongest objections to
purposivism in judicial statutory interpretation is what John Manning has
identified as a generality problem. “Giving precedence to semantic
context . . . is necessary to enable legislators to set the level of generality at
which they wish to express their policies.”201 To facilitate a statute’s
passage, “[l]egislators may compromise on a statute that does not
completely address a perceived mischief” or includes exceptions that
curtail the statute’s operation.202 By granting precedence to statutory text,
Manning argues that the court has a better chance of implementing the
legislative compromise at the level of specificity or generality of the policy
compromise. In contrast, “[b]y asking what policy a reasonable person
would adopt (rather than how a reasonable person would understand the
words),” Manning argues, “purposivist judges make it surpassingly
difficult for legislators to bargain over the choice of rules” versus standards
or the choice of statutory generality or specificity, in the legislative
process.203

201
202
203

Manning, What Divides, supra note 26, at 99.
Id. at 104.
Id. at 105.
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The generality problem, however, loses much of its force when
applied to agency statutory interpretation.204 When the agency interprets a
statute the agency administers, it is interpreting a statute that includes some
statement of purpose or principle; as argued in Part II, regulatory statutes
must include some such statement—whether as a statement of purpose, the
articulation of a standard, or some combination—to be constitutionally
valid.205 For legislation that includes such a statement, purposive
interpretation does not face a distinctive generality problem. Both the
textualist and the purposivist will need to endeavor to make inferences
from the enacted statement of purpose or principle, however general that
statement is. But that is not a task or problem that uniquely afflicts either
purposivism or textualism—it is just part of the labor of interpretation.
Of course, when a statute’s purposes or principles are highly general,
one might worry about the capacity of the interpreter to discern or specify
its meaning. But that is a separate objection, and indeed, gets to the very
point addressed above that agencies are better positioned than courts to
make inferences from general purposes.
C. Is This Constitutional?
The suggestion that Congress has specified the basic framework of
agency statutory interpretation confronts a constitutional question: May
Congress legislate agencies’ interpretive methods?
Nicholas Rosenkranz prompted interest in the question of the extent to
which Congress does, could, and should prescribe rules of statutory
interpretation for the federal courts.206 Scholars are divided on Congress’s
constitutional power to dictate the interpretive methods federal courts use
in statutory cases. That debate provides a helpful basis for considering the
analogous question of Congress’s power to set principles of interpretation
for agencies.
On the one hand, some view judicial interpretive methodology as
equivalent or akin in status to federal common law. “To the extent that the
judicial power includes power to develop interpretive rules, that power is a
federal common lawmaking power, which a contrary statute may trump.”207
On this view, Congress’s Article I powers presumptively include the power
to establish such rules, and there is no general separation of powers
204 I have previously argued that the generality problem loses force in interpretation of regulations.
See Stack, Interpreting Regulations, supra note 27, at 405–06.
205 See supra text accompanying notes 91–97.
206 See generally Rosenkranz, supra note 13.
207 Id. at 2140. See generally Gluck, Federal Common Law, supra note 67, at 804–11 (examining
implications of viewing federal rules of statutory interpretation as federal common law).
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objection based in Article III to prevent Congress from doing so. At most,
Congress would face non-Article III constraints on overriding principles of
statutory interpretation if, for instance, Congress sought to override
constitutionally-inspired clear statement rules.208 On the other hand, others
argue that separation of powers principles reflected in Article III’s vesting
of the “judicial power” in the Supreme Court and lower courts constrains
Congress’s power to direct the methods that judges use in deciding
statutory cases.209
Without resolving this debate, at least as it pertains to the judicial
powers under Article III, it is possible to see a relatively clear course for
establishing that Congress has the power to direct agencies to implement
and interpret their statutes in a purposive manner. Under the Necessary and
Proper Clause,210 it has long been understood that Congress has the power
“with respect to the means by which the powers it confers are to be carried
into execution.”211 Under this authority, it is well established that Congress
may specify the form that agency action is to take (say, rulemaking or
adjudication), the procedures that the agency must follow, as well as the
standards of review applicable internally within the agency. It is also well
established that Congress may specify the factors an agency may or may
not consider in making a determination, such as whether it may or must use
cost–benefit analysis, or whether it must make decisions on particular
timelines, and do so in consultation with particular officials and entities. As
Justice Scalia recently wrote on behalf of the Court, both agencies’ “power
to act and how they are to act is authoritatively prescribed by Congress.”212
Based on this major premise that Congress has power to dictate how
agencies are to act, the argument needs only the minor premise that
interpretation falls within that scope. That point seems hardly controversial;
as suggested above, the implementation of statutes is shot through with
interpretive operations, and interpretation is part and parcel of
implementation. Thus, if Congress may specify the details of agency
implementation, there is no general objection based on Article II to
Congress giving the agency interpretive directions. This is not to say that
one could not conceive of some interpretive direction that might violate
208

See Rosenkranz, supra note 13, at 2140 (analyzing the legal status of principles of
interpretation).
209 See Jellum, supra note 65, at 882–90; see also Jonathan T. Molot, Reexamining Marbury in the
Administrative State: A Structural and Institutional Defense of Judicial Power over Statutory
Interpretation, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1239, 1246 (2002).
210 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
211 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819). The statutes set out in the notes in
Part II.A provide nice illustrations. See supra notes 90–94.
212 City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1869 (2013).
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Article II (say, “interpret the statutes the agency administers exclusively as
directed by the congressional committee with jurisdiction over the
agency”). But the interpretive direction exposited here—to interpret the
statute in a purposive manner—does not run afoul of those boundaries.
Moreover, to the extent the interpretive instructions are grounded in a
reading of statutes, the power necessary is not the power to prescribe a
general method of interpretation for all statutes. It only requires that
Congress can direct how regulatory statutes are interpreted.213
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF AGENCY PURPOSIVISM
Understanding that regulatory statutes oblige agencies to be
purposivists, and that agencies have the capacities to meet this obligation,
has implications for central issues of administrative law and statutory
interpretation. For the judiciary, this understanding points to a reorientation
of the framework of judicial review of agency action. For the Executive
Branch, this understanding holds implications for the allocation and
balance of authority between the President and those agencies or agency
officials statutorily vested with power. And for interpretive theory, it
suggests a new application for purposivism.
A. Judicial Review of the Purposive Agency
Doctrines of judicial review of agency action implicitly rely upon a
conception of the agency and its role. At one extreme, if agencies are seen
primarily as vehicles for decisions based on current political preferences,
then judicial review might ask whether the agency action was ultra vires,
but not otherwise inquire how the agency reached its decision.214 At the
other extreme, if agencies are viewed primarily as technocratic actors, then
judicial review might be structured to treat evidence of political influence
as a red flag amidst an inquiry into whether the decision reflects sound

213 One might also argue on functionalist grounds that the interpretation of federal law is not core
to the constitutionally prescribed powers of the Executive Branch to the same extent that it is for the
judiciary. If that is correct—and part of my overriding point is that executive branch interpretation is
pervasive and unavoidable, so it is not a premise friendly to this underlying approach—then the stakes
of congressional prescription of interpretive rules for the Executive Branch does not pose the same
constitutional objections as it does for the judiciary. More generally, in view of the well-established
power of Congress to structure the execution of the federal law, Congress has substantial authority to
prescribe the interpretive approach that agencies pursue in the execution of federal law, outside of those
principles of statutory interpretation that might be required by the Constitution.
214 Early administrative law typically did not police the agent’s exercise of discretion. See Nicholas
Bagley, The Puzzling Presumption of Reviewability, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1295–1301 (2014);
Merrill, supra note 20, at 1001.
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technocratic judgment.215 Scholars have traced these and other conceptions
of the agency in current doctrines of judicial review of agency action.216
The argument thus far provides grounds for a reorientation in the
framework of judicial review of agency action. In particular, it suggests
that judicial review should be structured around an understanding of the
agency’s statutory duties. Based on the premise that regulatory statutes
require agencies to implement and interpret them in a purposive manner,
the basic question of judicial review might be some formulation of the
following inquiry:
Does the agency’s action further the statute’s purpose(s) by means
allowed by the statute and other law?
Reviewing courts could organize this basic inquiry around the
following issues: (1) the agency’s understanding of the statute’s purpose(s),
(2) the connection the agency has drawn between its actions and those
purposes, (3) whether the action is otherwise permitted by existing
statutory and constitutional and other law, and (4) whether the action is
well-founded in fact.
While this is not the place to offer a full-blown conception of judicial
review of agency action, it is worth highlighting how this framework
rationalizes current doctrines of review, relates to judicial deference, and
connects judicial and agency approaches to statutory interpretation.
1. Relationship to Current Doctrines.—It is first worth noting that
this purposivist framework of review is consistent with the APA. The
APA’s provision on the scope of review, § 706, mandates a reviewing court
to hold agency action unlawful if it is arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or not otherwise in accordance with law, contrary to the
Constitution, or in excess of statutory jurisdiction.217 The purposive
framework of review includes all of these inquiries. Determining the
statute’s purpose(s) involves evaluating questions of law, and assessing the
correctness and reasonableness of the agency’s specification of statutory
purpose(s). Asking about the connection between the agency’s account of
the statute’s purpose and its chosen means is a central element of the
arbitrariness review standard. Determining whether the agency’s action is
215 See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Deference and Democracy, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 761, 764
(2007) (exploring ways in which different paradigms of public administration correspond to, and help
define, approaches to judicial review).
216 See, e.g., Sidney Shapiro & Elizabeth Fisher, Chevron and the Legitimacy of “Expert” Public
Administration, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 465, 476–95 (2013) (exploring roles of rational–
instrumental and deliberative–constitutive understandings of public administration in the Chevron
canon).
217 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)–(C) (2012) (noting these elements of review among others).
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otherwise permitted by the statute and the Constitution is also part of
assessing whether the agency’s action is in accordance with the law and its
statutory authority. And finally, determining whether the agency’s action
has sufficient grounding in fact is part of arbitrariness (and substantial
evidence) review.218 The advantage of the purposivist approach is that it
builds these elements into a coherent framework based on the basic
statutory duties imposed on agencies.
Just as important, the purposivist framework provides a useful
reformulation of the two judicial doctrines that currently organize judicial
review—the Chevron doctrine and the standard of arbitrariness review
frequently associated with State Farm. Neither Chevron nor State Farm
take as their ordering inquiry the character of the agency’s statutory duty.
Under Chevron, the ordering issue of judicial review is statutory ambiguity
and permissibility,219 not the agency’s duties. If a fundamental statutory
requirement of agencies is that they discern a statute’s purposes, it makes
sense for a reviewing court to focus on reviewing compliance with that
duty. State Farm comes closer to recognizing the basic, purposive duty of
the agency, but it does so in the midst of a compilation of considerations,
without any overarching structure or rationale. State Farm requires the
agency to articulate a “rational connection between the facts found and the
choice made.”220 As explained above, this involves assessment of the
agency’s factual determinations and inferences from those facts, and
consideration of alternatives.221 It also involves the court assessing whether
the agency’s action comports with the purposes of the statute, including the
agency’s account of those purposes. What the purposive framework does is
organize aspects of the State Farm inquiry; the purposivist approach asks
reviewing courts to focus first on some of the issues that that arise under
State Farm—the agency’s articulation of an aim and a reasonable
218 As a point of comparison, the Chevron doctrine has a strained relationship with the text of
§ 706: that section requires the reviewing court to “decide all relevant questions of law,” which
Chevron can be read as defying. See Metzger, supra note 123, at 1300–02 (quoting § 706 and noting
tension between Chevron and the APA’s requirements, and suggesting Chevron’s status as
administrative common law); John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX.
L. REV. 113, 193–99 (1998). In contrast, as noted above, the basic inquiry into whether the agency’s
action furthers the statute’s purposes within permitted means fits comfortably with the text of § 706. A
court cannot judge whether the agency’s action is arbitrary or capricious under § 706(2)(A) without an
understanding of the basic aims of the statute and whether the agency’s actions in fact further those
aims. Likewise, asking whether the agency’s action is permitted by the statute would appear to be
required by the command in § 706(2)(C) that a reviewing court declare unlawful any agency action “in
excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations.” § 706(2)(C).
219 See supra text accompanying note 38 (describing the Chevron doctrine).
220 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (quoting
Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).
221 See id.
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connection to that aim—and then check that action against statutory
permissibility. In this regard, the purposivist approach could be seen as
suggesting that this rationalized State Farm inquiry, not Chevron, should
provide the organizing framework of judicial review.
2. Judicial Deference.—It is worth nothing that the statutory
arguments for the agency’s duty to engage in purposive interpretation
presented in Part II do not entail taking a position on the level of deference
a court would give to an agency’s position. Recognizing that the agency
has a statutory duty to implement and interpret its statute in a purposive
manner would be consistent with a court reviewing the agency’s action de
novo. But the inquiry could also be formulated in a deferential way,
something like the following: Has the agency reasonably interpreted the
statute’s purposes, do the agency’s actions have a rational connection to
those purposes, and are they not clearly prohibited? To the extent that the
basis for agency purposivism rests only on the formal statutory grounds (as
discussed in Part II), other arguments would be necessary to determine how
much, if any, deference a court should give the agency. In contrast, to the
extent the argument for agency purposivism also requires the institutional
competence arguments in Part III, those competence arguments provide
reasons why courts should accord a level of deference to the agency. Very
roughly, if agencies have greater competence than courts in inferring
purposes or determining how best to carry them out, courts should adopt a
deferential stance in reviewing the agency’s decisions. In sum, while the
statutory argument for agency purposivism may be sufficient for some, and
the addition of the institutional competence arguments necessary for others,
that choice has implications for whether recognizing agency purposivism
also suggests judicial deference to the agency’s actions.
3. Agency and Judicial Statutory Interpretation.—Finally,
highlighting the statutory grounds of the agency’s duty provides an
interesting angle on the relationship between an agency’s and a reviewing
court’s approach to statutory interpretation. As Jerry Mashaw has observed,
to the extent one emphasizes the distinctiveness of the agency’s approach
to statutory interpretation, it is hard to see how there might be genuine
deference to the agency.222 In other words, the suggestion that courts and
agencies occupy “parallel universes of interpretive discourse” as Mashaw
writes, “seems to undermine the very possibility of an authentically
deferential judicial posture,” prompting what he calls a “paradox of

222

See Mashaw, Norms, supra note 3, at 537–38.
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deference.”223 The same fundamental idea operates in Caleb Nelson’s
argument that Chevron deference does not require that a judge defer to an
agency’s choice of interpretive approach with which the judge disagrees
(say, a textualist judge reviewing a purposive agency, or a purposive judge
reviewing a textualist agency).224
One interesting feature of the purposive understanding of the agency
is that, within the context of judicial review of agency action, this account
narrows the distance between the agency’s approach to statutory
interpretation and the judicial approach. Based on the premise that the
agency has a statutory duty to engage in a purposive interpretation of the
statutes it administers, it would seem to follow that the most basic
obligation of the reviewing court is to ascertain whether the agency has
validly performed that duty. Put another way, the reviewing court has an
obligation (absent some constitutional restriction) to review whether the
agency has complied with its statutory duties, which means asking whether
the agency’s purposive interpretations are valid.
This has interesting implications for a textualist judge’s review of
agency action. If the basis for the agency’s duty to interpret the statute in a
purposive manner would be recognized on formal statutory grounds alone
(such as those discussed in Part II above), then this approach provides an
argument for a textualist judge to approach review of agency action within
a purposive framework. Part II argues that an agency has statutory
obligations, of a kind a textualist would recognize, to interpret the statutes
it administers in a purposive manner. If so, then a textualist judge, no less
than a purposivist one, would have an obligation to review the agency’s
compliance with its statutory duties—duties to implement and interpret the
statute in a purposive manner—so long as there was no constitutional
impediment to doing so. This does not imply that the court would be
obliged to evaluate these issues in exactly the same way as the agency; the
court might, for instance, grant less credence than the agency to a statute’s
legislative history. But consideration of the bearing of legislative history
would arise within a framework in which the court was evaluating the
agency’s reading of the statute’s purposes, the rationality of the agency’s
action in light of those purposes, and whether the agency’s action was
otherwise permitted. In short, the purposive understanding of the agency’s
obligations suggests that reviewing courts are also obliged to review
agency action within a purposive framework (unless there is some
constitutional reason for not doing so). This does not wholly solve the

223
224
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Id. at 537.
Nelson, supra note 30, at 362–66.
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paradox of deference, but goes a significant way toward overcoming it by
exposing grounds for the reviewing courts to approach review from the
agency’s perspective.225
To summarize, perhaps because of its superficially appealing two-step
formulation, Chevron has come to be treated as the ordering or default
structure of judicial review. Examination of the character of the agency’s
duty under regulatory statutes suggests a different orientation, one focused
on assessing the validity of the agency’s exercise of its basic purposive
duty in interpretation and implementation. This approach could be more or
less deferential, but its critical feature is that it corrals the reviewing court
into examining the validity of agency action from within the framework of
the agency’s purposive statutory duties.
B. The President and the Purposive Agency
At its core, the purposive understanding offers an account of the
statutory power and duties created by regulatory statutes. This account
holds implications for the scope of presidential and other political influence
over agency action.
Presidents have strong incentives to assert control over agency action.
While presidents occasionally distance themselves from agencies by
blaming them for missteps,226 overall presidents cannot avoid the political
reality that they are held accountable for the actions of administrative
agencies, not just the actions of the Executive Office of the President.227
These strong incentives have created a host of enduring issues for
administrative and constitutional law. The debate centers around the
constitutional and statutory scope of the President’s appointment and
removal powers and the President’s powers to review and direct agency
actions, the level of disclosure of the President’s contacts with agencies,
and the bearing of the President’s influence on agency action in judicial
review.
While it is uncontroversial that the President, by virtue of his
appointment power or other means, may—and indeed, should—
legitimately influence agency decisions,228 the critical problem is
distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate types of influence. That question

225 This provides a statutory grounding for Judge Katzmann’s position that courts should
understand “the methodology of agency interpretation of statutes.” KATZMANN, supra note 46, at 27.
226 Stephenson, supra note 45, at 300–01.
227 See LEWIS, supra note 133, at 4.
228 See id. at 23.
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turns in part, as Nina Mendelson writes, on the content of the influence.229
At the extreme, as Kathryn Watts observes, purely partisan considerations
stand on a very different footing than presidential inputs which “seek to
implement policy considerations or value judgments tied in some sense to
the statutory scheme being implemented.”230
Fundamentally, what counts as a legitimate or illegitimate influence
depends on the character of the agency’s statutory duty. In other words,
whether political factors are legitimate or not will depend in part on what
the agency is obliged to do. If an agency were merely vested to make a
decision with no guiding criteria, then presumably a wide range of political
influences would have a legitimate place for the agency.231 Indeed, a statute
structured that way might be seen as designed to foreground political
preferences. But the same does not hold when a statute specifies a
hierarchy of decisional factors, findings, and aims.
The purposive reading of regulatory statutes provides an account of
the duty they impose on agencies. At a basic level, the purposive account
requires that the agency’s action further, and be rationalized in terms of the
statute’s aims. As argued in Part II, that duty is rooted in the obligations the
statute imposes, and does not depend upon the actor who asserts power
under the statute. In other words, those duties apply to the officials within
the agency to whom powers are subdelegated, as well as to a President
asserting the agency’s statutory authority (when that is permitted).
Accordingly, the purposive account gives an answer to the type of
influence upon which the agency may legitimately rely: The agency may
legitimately rely on the President’s views regarding the best reading of the
statute’s purposes, the factors the agency may consider, the means the
statute permits, as well as how the statute is best implemented. Put another
way, the President’s views are a legitimate influence so long as they reflect
a view of how the statute is best read in context. What this disallows is
purely political justifications for action and unreasoned justifications
(“[t]he President said so”232) or value-based justifications that do not follow
from the factors or purposes of the statute.

229 Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing “Political” Oversight of Agency Decision Making, 108 MICH.
L. REV. 1127, 1141 (2010).
230 Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review,
119 YALE L.J. 2, 56 (2009).
231 See Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 476 (1994) (noting that the Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-510, § 2903(e), 104 Stat. 1808, 1812 (1990), codified at
10 U.S.C. § 2687 note (2012), “does not at all limit the President’s discretion” to accept or reject the
Commission’s recommendation).
232 Mendelson, supra note 229, at 1176.
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It is important to note that simply specifying what type of influence is
legitimate does not imply that the agency is legally obliged to follow the
President’s directives. The question of what content is legitimate is distinct
from the question of whether the President has authority to direct the
agency’s actions. The content of the President’s directive could be
legitimate, but the agency could have no obligation to follow the
President’s view; likewise, the content could be illegitimate, even if the
agency has an obligation to follow (legitimate) presidential direction. The
question of the scope of the President’s authority to direct agency action is
an issue for which there is a robust debate on both constitutional and
statutory dimensions.233 The point here is that the purposive account
identifies the duties regulatory statutes impose, and thus what counts as a
legitimate influence, without answering the separate question of allocation
of authority between the agency and the President.
By clarifying that the grounds of the agency’s interpretive obligations
are statutory, the purposive account highlights the limits on the President’s
powers to override this approach. While this is not the place for a complete
analysis of the scope of the President’s autonomous constitutional powers
in relation to Congress’s powers to structure the government, it should at
least be clear that a statutory foundation for the agency’s interpretive
approach, as opposed to merely a prudential or policy basis, dramatically
restricts the power of the President to alter it. The President may still have
some residual constitutional power to defy the ways in which Congress has
structured the Executive Branch,234 but in the main, the President must
abide by Congress’s choices about how agency authority is structured.
Accordingly, the President will generally not have power to order an
administrative agency to defy its duty to purposively implement the statutes
it administers.
C. The Law–Politics Distinction in the Administrative State
The purposive understanding can also be viewed as offering a more
general account of the relationship between law and politics in the
administrative state. A common conception is that law in a regulatory
statute creates a zone of discretion, a range of permissible actions, but does
not necessarily or often have anything to say about decisionmaking within
233 For an overview, see Nina A. Mendelson, Another Word on the President’s Statutory Authority
over Agency Action, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2455 (2011), Stack, Statutory Powers, supra note 176, at
274, and Peter L. Strauss, Foreword: Overseer, or “the Decider”? The President in Administrative
Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696 (2007) [hereinafter Strauss, Overseer].
234 See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 492 (2010)
(declaring dual layer of for-cause protection an unconstitutional infringement on the President’s
executive power).
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that zone. On this common view, “law” in the administrative state shares
the binary qualities of judicial judgments in which criminal and civil
liability is a yes-or-no conclusion, but fades from view thereafter; the
decision is understood to be one of pure discretion,235 to which the actors
are only accountable in their political capacities. This view invites a highly
political, indeed politicized, conception of the operation of administrative
government. This conception of the law–politics distinction is also
reflected in the reformist impulse to design discretion out of administrative
government. If law leaves the agency with a zone of pure discretion, the
thought is we need more “law” to confine that zone.
As suggested above, the purposive account of agency statutory
interpretation conceives of the relationship between law and politics
differently. To be sure, one function of law and legal considerations is to
identify the scope of the agency’s powers. But, on the purposive view of
interpretation, there is necessarily a continuing role for legal considerations
within the zone of those actions that are within the agency’s powers.
Purposive reasoning has a teleological form in the sense that it obliges the
agency to carry forward the ends established by statute. As a result, on a
purposive account, “law” has just as much to say about decisionmaking
within a zone of authorized actions as it does about how to identify that
zone. The policy or purpose of the statute remains the guide to the agency’s
action all the way to its completion, and accordingly, legitimate
presidential (or other political) influence must be offered as a reading of
what the statute seeks to achieve.
This is not to deny that occasionally statutes do vest pure discretion in
agencies to make up-or-down decisions without any criteria; but such
statutory schemes are the exception, not the rule. And within that general
rule, law not only prohibits but guides the agency’s practical reasoning.
D. The Promise of Purposivism
In the last few years, scholars have shown renewed interest in the
promise of purposivism. This “new,”236 “structured,”237 or textually
constrained238 purposivism departs from traditional applications by giving
more prominence to authoritative textual sources. Purposivism had been
associated with allegiance to implementing a statute’s highest-level
purposes, even if that meant an undisciplined approach to complying with
235 As Peter Strauss emphasizes with all caps to capture his intonation, “DISCRETION!” See
Strauss, Overseer, supra note 233, at 708–09.
236 See Manning, New Purposivism, supra note 27.
237 See Gluck, Laboratories, supra note 14, at 1842–43.
238 Stack, Interpreting Regulations, supra note 27, at 409.
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the limits established by statutory text.239 The renewed accounts of
purposivism, in contrast, take as a fixed premise the idea that the text
establishes the boundaries for permissible interpretations.
Regarding statutory interpretation by the Supreme Court, for instance,
John Manning argues that a recent set of decisions suggests a new
convergence on a textually constrained form of purposivism.240 In this new
strain of purposivism that Manning finds, the Court attends carefully to the
level of generality of the text. On the one hand, this means implementing
choices directed by precise statutory text even if they conflict with the
overall purpose of the statute.241 On the other hand, this approach still
permits consulting broader purposes where the language itself is more
general.242 Either way, these new purposivist opinions take text as a critical
limit on when and in what way inferences about the purpose of the statute
may be drawn.243 In a similar vein, Abbe Gluck identifies interpretive
practices in state courts that allow for the consideration of purpose and
legislative history, but only where the statutory text is unclear.244 While
Gluck classifies these approaches as textualist, as she notes, they could just
as well be associated with purposivism.245 In other work, I have argued that
the interpretation of regulations should be purposivist of a textually
constrained variety, restricting the interpretation to remain consistent with
the purposes the agency establishes both in the text of the regulation and its
authoritative accompanying statement, the statement of basis and
purpose.246 By asking what interpretations are both permitted by the
regulation’s text and consistent with its purposes, there is greater notice of
the regulation’s meaning than merely asking what interpretations the
regulatory text permits.
These readings have firm roots in Hart and Sacks.247 Recall that Hart
and Sacks take as a fixed principle that the interpreter “ought never to give

239

Manning, New Purposivism, supra note 27, at 121–23.
Id. at 146.
241 See id. at 132–37 (discussing Justice Kagan’s opinion of the Court in Milner v. Dep’t of the
Navy, 131 S. Ct. 1259 (2011)).
242 See id. at 137–41 (discussing Justice Kagan’s opinion of the Court in Fox v. Vice, 131 S. Ct.
2205 (2011)).
243 See id. at 146.
244 Gluck, Laboratories, supra note 14, at 1829–32 (summarizing the components of modified
textualism, which she documents in state courts).
245 See id. at 1842–43.
246 See Stack, Interpreting Regulations, supra note 27, at 409.
247 For two arguments for the roots of this strain in Hart and Sacks, see Manning, New
Purposivism, supra note 27, at 148–80, and Stack, Interpreting Regulations, supra note 27, at 389–90.
240
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the words of a statute a meaning they will not bear.”248 Hart and Sacks’s
commitment to statutory text follows from one of the two core premises of
their theory: their principle of institutional settlement.249
The purposive approach to agency statutory interpretation defended in
this Article shares the same premises. It starts from the recognition that a
wider class of statutes than previously appreciated includes textually
indicated purposes—namely, regulatory statutes. It then emphasizes that
agencies have a duty to heed those purposes and structure their activities in
relation to them. The result is to shift the debate away from the question of
whether purposes exist in regulatory statutes to the hard work of specifying
statutory purposes and translating them into applications consistent with the
means permitted. That is agencies’ work—and also the work for renewed
purposivism.250
CONCLUSION
Theories may almost always arrive late,251 but the theory of agency
statutory interpretation has been especially tardy. After decades of debate
have focused on how courts interpret statutes, attention is turning to
agencies, the first and frequently final interpreters of statutes. This Article
contributes to this examination by defending a theory of agency statutory
interpretation. That theory begins with a simple suggestion: Given how
comprehensively regulatory statutes structure the manner in which agencies
act, it makes sense to examine whether regulatory statutes provide
interpretive direction to agencies.

248

HART & SACKS, supra note 12, at 1375.
HART & SACKS, supra note 12, at 4; Manning, New Purposivism, supra note 27, at 154; Stack,
Interpreting Regulations, supra note 27, at 389; see also supra text accompanying note 177 (discussing
the principle).
250 Interestingly, this approach also has the potential to influence the interpretation of regulatory
legislation in a public-regarding way. Jonathan Macey argued in a celebrated article that the articulated
purposes of statutes, even of special interest statutes, almost always have a public-regarding gloss. See
Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An
Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 251 (1986). The primary reason is that it is less costly
to interest groups to obtain passage of special interest legislation with such a public-regarding gloss. See
id.; see also SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, RETHINKING THE PROGRESSIVE AGENDA: THE REFORM OF THE
AMERICAN REGULATORY STATE 44–56 (1992) (arguing for judicial enforcement of the requirement that
legislation states purposes). The conclusions of this Article have obvious relevance for their line of
thought. If (1) regulatory statutes should be understood as having enacted purposes and (2) agencies are
viewed as obliged to pursue those purposes, as argued above, then agencies will be obliged to interpret
them in accordance with their purposes. Doing so—reading statutes in light of their articulated
purposes—is likely to lead agencies to implement them in more public-regarding ways. Agency
purposivism thus not only clarifies the character of an agency’s duty under statute, but also holds
promise for combating one of the oldest problems of our Republic, the influence of faction.
251 Leslie Green, The Concept of Law Revisited, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1687, 1715 (1996) (“Everyone
admits that the theories arrive late . . . .”).
249
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That examination is revealing. It shows that regulatory statutes impose
distinctive obligations on administrative agencies to carry forward the
powers granted in light of the purposes or principles the statutes establish.
To implement that basic obligation, agencies must adopt a structure of
practical reasoning in which they specify the statute’s purposes, evaluate
alternatives in relation to those purposes, and select an alternative that,
other things equal, best carries forward those purposes. That structure of
reasoning is purposivist, not textualist. Moreover, this Article argues
agencies are particularly well-equipped institutions to perform these tasks
required by a purposive structure of interpretation.
Understanding agencies as purposive interpreters reorients judicial
review and political control of agency action. This approach exposes that
agencies are obliged to pursue statutory purposes within the space of
otherwise permitted actions. As a result, the basic obligation of a reviewing
court is to ask whether the agency has correctly or reasonably specified the
statute’s purposes and chosen reasonable means of pursuing those ends, not
to inquire whether a statute is ambiguous on a particular issue. While there
are footholds for incorporating this approach into existing doctrines, it
represents a significant simplification and reordering of current standards
of judicial review of agency action. By giving an account of the agency’s
legal duties of implementation, this theory also informs the debate about
the scope of presidential and other political influence over agencies. In
particular, if the agency is bound to make choices in light of statutory ends,
then presidential influence over the agency is valid only when expressed in
those terms. Finally, interpretation within the agency reveals an important
instance in which law serves as a source of guidance about ends, not
merely a set of constraints. While we might have misgivings about courts
embracing a form of interpretive perfectionism, it defines the task of
agencies.
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